


HB| 



fcE 



*■ 



31 






HI! hI 
HBHR 










lillla 

■'■:■ >■■<-;■ ■ ■ ■■■■ 



■■■■ 



S^B 




Class 
Book 







CopyrightN°_ 



COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT. 



THE WAR AND THE 
COMING PEACE 

THE MORAL ISSUE 



By MORRIS JASTROW, Jr., Ph.D.,LL.D. 
The War and The Bagdad Railway 

THE STORY OF ASIA MINOR AND ITS RELATION TO 
THE PRESENT CONFLICT. 

14 Illustrations and a Map. $1.50 Net. 

Boston Transcript: "Of all the books that have 
come to our notice, works dealing primarily with 
the problems of Bagdad, Professor Morris Jas- 
trow's 'The War and the Bagdad Railway,' with 
its illustrative map, is unquestionably the best." 

The New Republic: " Hard to match for brev- 
ity and clearness. As an Oriental scholar, Pro- 
fessor Jastrow is singularly well equipped to set 
forth in the light of history the conditions that 
have made Asia Minor such a disastrous breeder 
of strife, and this is, in fact, his most interesting 
contribution." 

The Civilization of Babylonia and 
Assyria 

ITS REMAINS, LANGUAGE, HISTORY, RELIGION, 
COMMERCE, LAW, ART AND LITERATURE. 

With Map and 164 Illustrations. 
Octavo. Gilt Top. In a box $7.00 Net* 

.Art and Archaeology : "This magnificent book 
gives a comprehensive and complete survey of the 
whole _ civilization of the ancient peoples, who 
dwelt in the Tigro-Euphrates Valley. It is writ- 
ten by one of the foremost Semitic scholars of the 
world, and supersedes all works upon the subject. 
Written in the author's characteristic lucid style, 
it is sumptuously illustrated, and is a beautiful 
specimen of bookmaking." 



THE WAR AND THE 
COMING PEACE 

THE MORAL ISSUE 



MORRIS JASTROW, Jr., Ph.D., LL.D. 

PROFESSOR IN THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 

AUTHOR OF "THE WAR AND THE BAGDAD RAILWAY," "THE CIVILIZATION 
OF BABYLONIA AND ASSYRIA," ETC., ETC. 



"Thi6 is the consolation on which we rest in the 
darkness of the future and in the conflicts of 
today, that the government of the world is moral 
and does forever destroy what is not." 

— Emerson. 



PHILADELPHIA AND LONDON 
J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY 

1918 



COPYRIGHT, I9I8, BY J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY 



PUBLISHED MAY, 1918 



PRINTED BY J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY 

AT THE WASHINGTON SQUARE PRESS 

PHILADELPHIA, U. 8. A. 



MAY 22 1918 
©CI.A497416 



To 
I. F. B. 

AND 

F.H.B. 



PREFACE 

This book is in a measure an outgrowth 
of the author's " The War and the Bagdad 
Railway." In the latter work my main pur- 
pose was to show in the light of history the 
significance of the region through which the 
Bagdad Railway passes, and how by the 
conversion of what should have been a purely 
commercial enterprise into an imperialistic 
project, backed by a powerful military au- 
tocracy, Pan-Germanism became a menace 
to the entire civilized world. Underlying 
the menace, however, is a moral issue which 
was incidentally touched upon in the con- 
cluding chapter of the book. While writing 
the chapter, I felt that the larger, which are 
also the deeper, aspects of the conflict sug- 
gested by the moral issue, merited a fuller 
treatment. I have, accordingly, yielded to 
the impulse to set forth in greater detail cer- 
tain views in regard to this vital issue, 



PREFACE 

reached as the result of constant reading on 
the war and on the problem of peace, and 
which, I trust I am justified in believing, 
may be of some value to others. The main 
theme that I endeavor to establish is that 
both the war and the coming peace are to be 
viewed from the same angle — from the 
point of view of what is shown to be the 
moral issue. For this reason the book has 
been divided into two parts, one on the war 
as a moral issue, and the other on the prob- 
lem of peace. 

I have tried to show that the issue may be 
summed up in a single formula, to wit, that 
we are fighting an unholy alliance between 
power and national ambitions, and that this 
power is exerted in two directions — power as 
the means of carrying out national policies, 
and power on the part of a military group, 
headed by a ruler who embodies in his per- 
son the principle of autocracy, as a measure 
of holding a nation in its tight grasp. These 
two aspects of power, as represented by the 



PREFACE 

present German government, are the two 
sides of a single shield ; and one of the main 
contentions in the unfolding of this theme 
is to show how Germany's conduct of the 
war, with its revolting catalogue of wrongs 
and crimes, as well as its spy system and in- 
sidious propaganda, is the direct and logical 
outcome of such an alliance between national 
ambitions and power, controlled by a group 
whose necessary concern is its own self- 
perpetuation. 

Back of Germany's conduct of the war, 
however, lies the responsibility for the war, 
with all the sufferings it has entailed on the 
entire world. That, too, is to be traced to 
the same unholy alliance, and one of my 
aims in developing the theme is to show how 
in the history of mankind a moral issue al- 
ways ensues, when power or the threat of 
power is used to force a national policy. 
Even right, when joined with might, leads 
to an abuse of power and to a menace, 
against which the world, in defense of lib- 



PREFACE 

erty and civilization, must needs arm itself. 

In dealing with the problem of peace 
from the same point of view, I have been 
careful to differentiate between terms of 
peace and the general question of the kind 
of peace which should follow the triumph 
of the moral issue. My concern is solely 
with the general question, for I feel strongly 
that not only is it idle to discuss terms of 
peace while the issue still hangs in the bal- 
ance, but that this aspect of the study must 
be left with those who have been entrusted 
with official authority. What, however, is 
needed, while the conflict is still going on, 
is the clarification of public opinion as to 
what is meant by peace, and how the peace 
which the world needs can be brought about. 

It is important that our statesmen and 
diplomatists — and this applies to other coun- 
tries as well as to ours — should be guided 
by public opinion, and this in turn involves 
that public opinion should become crystal- 
lized. It is in the hope of making a modest 
10 



PREFACE 

contribution towards such an end that I have 
tried to make clear to myself, and then to 
set forth for others, the result of constant 
reading and thought on a subject that has 
already brought forth a large number of 
contributions from the best minds in this 
country, as well as in England and France. 
Whatever may be the defects of my discus- 
sion of the subject — and I lay no claim to 
any authority except that of an earnest stu- 
dent of existing conditions — it will, I trust, 
be found to be based on a broad considera- 
tion of the theme. I am also in hopes that 
my main thought in this connection, the 
avoidance of conditions which will make it 
possible in the future for a group in any 
countiy, representing a government instead 
of representing a people, either to deter- 
mine upon war or to arrange the terms of 
peace, will commend itself to my readers. 

I confess to a spirit of optimism, though 
there is little in the present situation to jus- 
tify it ; and I am prepared for the criticism 
11 



PREFACE 

that the hope of disarmament and the 
growth of internationalism after the war, 
symbolized by an international parliament 
in some form, is a fanciful dream. It may 
be so. But, on the other hand, if one's 
thought is directed towards reading the 
signs of the times, it must be evident, even 
to those who look at the facts sternly, with- 
out the aid of the imagination, that the 
world has been moving for some time in the 
direction of international combinations to 
carry out high endeavors. This is certainly 
true in intellectual and commercial fields, 
as also, though to a less degree, in the realm 
of international political relations. The 
war itself in assembling nations of the dis- 
tant East with those of the West, to defend 
the bulwarks of civilization and liberty, is a 
most notable expression of the internation- 
alistic spirit, particularly when we bear in 
mind that some of these nations not so very 
long ago looked upon one another as rivals 

rather than as allies. The remarkable as- 
12 



PREFACE 

pect of unity presented at present by a large 
part of the civilized world calls for an in- 
terpretation, and I feel that it can have only 
one meaning — the preparation for the next 
step that will lead the peoples of the world 
to a larger recognition of cooperation in an 
international sense, as a means both to 
secure peace and to promote the aims of 
civilization, which can only be carried out 
through peace. Viewed in this light, the 
creation of an international parliament in 
some form, upon the triumph of the moral 
issue, would appear to be not at all of the 
nature of an idle dream, but a step sug- 
gested by the logic of events, though the 
realization may not come for some time. It 
depends upon conditions at the end of the 
war, and upon the rapidity with which 
events may move upon the termination of 
the conflict. All that I have in mind in 
venturing to set forth certain views is to 
indicate the direction towards which our 
gaze should be turned when trying to peer 

13 



PREFACE 

into the future, at present still hidden under 
such a thick veil. That veil will be lifted 
when the menace at present confronting the 
world shall have been removed. 

It only remains for me to express, as on 
previous occasions, my sense of deep obliga- 
tion to my wife, who has again given me the 
benefit of her judgment and criticism in the 
reading of both the manuscript and the 
proof. I desire also gratefully to acknowl- 
edge a number of valuable suggestions in 
the treatment of the theme, made by Mr. 
E. S. Holloway. 

Morris Jastrow, Jr. 

Philadelphia, April, 1918 



14 



CONTENTS 

I 
THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE ... 17 

II 
THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 93 



" Politically, the young are old, and only the 
old are young. The love of liberty, in the English 
sense, is to be found in Germany only among men 
of the generation which, within ten years, will have 
disappeared. 

" And when that time comes, Germany will lie 
alone, isolated, hated by neighbouring countries; a 
stronghold of conservatism in the centre of Europe. 
Around it, in Italy, in France, in Russia in the 
North, there will rise a generation imbued with 
international ideas and eager to carry them out in 
life. But Germany will lie there, old and half 
stifled in her coat of mail, armed to the teeth and 
protected by all the weapons of murder and defence 
which science can invent. 

" And there will come great struggles and greater 
wars. If Germany wins, Europe, in comparison 
with America, will politically be as Asia in compari- 
son to Europe. But if Germany loses, then . . . 

" But it is not seemly to play the prophet." 
(Written in 1881.) 

George Brandes, The World at War. 



PART I 

THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 



THE WAR AND THE 
COMING PEACE 

THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 
I 

There are two ways of looking at the 
great conflict. We may have regard to the 
issues that lie at the surface, or we may en- 
deavor to probe to the deeper significance 
of the war, for there is always an undercur- 
rent to surface events. On the surface, wars 
reveal race antagonisms, religious dissen- 
sions, political ambitions or economic rival- 
ries as the more immediate causes, but a 
closer analysis will generally show an under- 
current that will enable us to reach a better 
understanding of the real issues involved. 
At all events, a consideration of the present 
war's deeper significance will set forth the 
issue in a clearer light. 

19 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

In the case of a conflict like the present 
one, involving actively almost four-fifths of 
the entire world and affecting the remaining 
fifth, the presumption is that there must be 
some undercurrent of so fundamental a 
character as to lead to the varied and con- 
fusing manifestations on the surface. It 
ought to be possible to resolve the surface 
complications into a formula that will ac- 
count for the many-sided phenomena pre- 
sented by the war. It will be my endeavor 
in these pages to show that the essential 
issue involved in this war is not political nor 
economic, but moral, and it is perhaps best 
to set forth, at the outset, the thesis to be 
established by the discussion, that the moral 
issue involved in this war is the recognition 
on the part of the world that an attempt to 
carry out national policies through the ap- 
peal to force, or even by the threat of force, 
is a cardinal sin against the moral conscience 
of mankind. A Hebrew prophet voiced the 

message over 2000 years ago, when he re- 
20 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

minded those who stood for force and vio- 
lence in his day, " Not by might and not by 
strength, but by my word, says the Lord of 
Hosts." The word is the idea, and ideas 
must make their way through their inherent 
strength and their direct appeal. We kill 
the idea when we attempt to force it upon 
the world, and this applies to the realm of 
religion as much as to that of political 
ambition. 

This, then, is my theme — that we are 
fighting an attempt to propagate a national 
policy through military force, and that this 
issue is a moral one. 

By way of approach to the subject, it 
will be well for us briefly to recall the aspect 
presented by the war at its outbreak in 1914, 
and to contrast that with the situation at the 
present time. For a decade at least pre- 
ceding the outbreak the scene was being set 
in Europe for a gigantic struggle. The air 
was becoming increasingly heavy from year 

to year, and as the chief cause, though not 
21 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

necessarily the only one, for the laden at- 
mosphere we must set down Germany's ag- 
gressive policy in seeking domination in 
the East. The trend towards the East had 
become the watchword of an expansionist 
movement in Germany that had its logical 
outcome in the definite program of Pan- Ger- 
manism, and of which the Bagdad Railway 
project, inaugurated at the beginning of the 
century, was the visible expression. Behind 
the railway stood a strongly entrenched mili- 
tary government whose ambitions were for 
domination. 1 Since Europe had inherited 
from the middle of the nineteenth century 
the policy of the " Balance of Power " be- 
tween the European nations as the sole 
means of preserving the peace, the military 
and political growth of Germany led to an 
alignment of France, Russia and England 
as forces to counteract the -growing ap- 

1 This subject has been fully set forth in Chapter 
III of the author's recent work on " The War and 
the Bagdad Railway" (Philadelphia, 1917). 
22 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

proach between Germany, Austria-Hun- 
gary and Turkey. As an offset to Pan- Ger- 
manism a Pan- Slavonic policy was pursued, 
looking to a union of the Slavic States of 
the Balkan Peninsula under Russian con- 
trol. The situation was further complicated 
by the movement inaugurated by Greece 
for a combination of Balkan States against 
Turkey, followed by a break in the combi- 
nation that was quite as serious as the short- 
lived union. Growing economic rivalry be- 
tween England and Germany was another 
disturbing factor, and since under the his- 
torical traditions which have dominated Eu- 
rope for many centuries, war is always im- 
minent when relations between European 
nations become strained, the outbreak in 
1914 had all the appearance of being a strug- 
gle between rivals for the position of su- 
premacy in European affairs. The balance 
of power was upset or in danger of being 
upset. It is indeed amazing to see how 
many problems were confronting the Euro- 

23 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

pean world in 1914, any one of which was 
capable of leading to an ordeal by battle. 2 
To us in this country, living under skies 
which normally make for peace, war is the 
last resort, but Europe has for so many 
centuries been living under the shadow of 
war, that a long era of peace is abnormal 
rather than normal. Despite the unques- 
tioned leadership of European nations in 
the arts and sciences, Europe, chained to 
hide-bound traditions, is nearer to the bar- 
baric instinct to make a test of rival claims 
through the appeal to arms. It was a mere 
chance that the war did not break out in 
1911 over the Agadir incident, as it was 
a chance that it came in 1914 through the 
firing of a pistol at an Austrian Archduke. 
But what thus appeared to be at the out- 
set a struggle for supremacy among Euro- 
pean nations soon revealed itself as a contest 

2 For a convenient and lucid survey of these 
problems, see G. Lowes Dickinson, " European 
Anarchy " (New York, 1916). 
24 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

of an entirely different order. When a few 
days after the opening of the war, Germany 
broke a solemn obligation and passed into 
Belgium as a short-cut to France, the step 
foreshadowed the passing of the war from 
a struggle for supremacy into a moral issue. 
The world was at first startled by the an- 
nouncement, and then grew indignant on 
realizing the full significance of this act. 
Those who, while condemning the act, yet 
clung to the Germany of their ideals, who 
kept in their hearts memories of a Germany 
that had given the world so much that was 
of value, hoped that some satisfactory ex- 
planation might still be forthcoming, some 
explanation of an act so contrary to the tra- 
ditions of faithfulness — " Deutsche Treue " 
— that had found a tender expression in Ger- 
man folk-songs, and an impressive one in the 
ethical systems of her great thinkers. The 
frank confession of the German Chancellor 
in his first utterance on the subject, that the 
step was wrong, and the assurance that it 

25 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

was prompted by urgent necessity of self- 
defense, held out the hope that at least from 
this point of view the step would be not jus- 
tified, for wrong cannot under any circum- 
stances be justified, but at least given a less 
hideous aspect. That confession, however, 
remains to this day an isolated utterance, 
and its sincerity is necessarily questioned by 
the brutal acts that followed. In the light 
of these acts it is now seen that the confes- 
sion of the Chancellor, involving the admis- 
sion of not hesitating to commit a wrong, 
was merely a cold-blooded statement of a 
policy which stopped short of nothing, and 
which had been determined upon long before 
the outbreak of the war. Germany's ruth- 
less treatment of Belgium, involving a cate- 
gory of crimes almost unparalleled in human 
history, revealed in all its hideousness the 
dastardly plan, long prepared, to terrorize 
the world into subjugation to the will of a 
military monster. Germany, like the Rome 
of Caesar's days, had enthroned power as her 

26 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

god, and ruthless power at that. Through 
this deity the national ambitions were to be 
carried out. That is the real significance of 
the fatal step taken on August 3rd; and 
Germany's conduct of the war from that 
time to the present, involving the applica- 
tion of all the cruel refinements of modern 
science to warfare, has helped to clarify the 
moral issue as it has united the greater part 
of the civilized world in the determination 
to stamp out a spirit and a policy which has 
brought upon mankind the bloodiest con- 
flict in history. All other issues which ap- 
peared to be contributing causes for the out- 
break of the war have receded into the 
background. The one figure that has stood 
out for almost four years against an angry 
sky is the man in " shining armor," deter- 
mined at all hazards to carry out forcibly 
national ambitions. A new Constantine has 
arisen who sees, instead of a Cross in the 
heavens, a sword in hoc signo vinces — " By 
this sign conquer." 

27 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 
II 

The issue has been resolved through the 
policy followed by the German government 
in the conduct of the war into a moral one. 
It is a struggle of the civilized world against 
the systematic plan of that government to 
oppose the currents of the age by the exhi- 
bition of force. The German government 
claims to be waging a defensive war. That 
is true. But what that government is de- 
fending is not the boundaries of the country 
or the existence of Germany as a nation, but 
a policy that can only be carried out by mili- 
tary strength, a system of terrorization that 
if successful will spell the moral downfall 
of the world, as well as its submission to a 
Moloch of brute power. For this reason 
the civilized world, with the exception of the 
nations whose interests are for the time being 
so closely bound up with Germany that they 
cannot cut loose, or whose geographic posi- 
tion forbids a participation in the conflict — 
with these exceptions, the entire civilized 

28 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

world has risen almost instinctively against 
the glorification of power. This rebellion is 
not due to hostility towards a people, nor 
does it arise from a desire to inflict an in- 
jury on a great country, but solely from the 
recognition of the fact that the resort to 
power in enforcing a national policy is an 
immoral act, fraught with danger to human- 
ity and to humanitarianism. This is the real 
issue in the war as it has gradually shaped 
itself during the past three years. The war 
has become a crusade for saving the world 
from the domination of force. 

That Germany with her noteworthy 
record of achievement in art, in science, in 
philosophy, in literature, in music, and in 
so many other domains should thus have be- 
come a menace to the world is a matter of 
bitter regret and profound disappointment 
to the many who from direct knowledge had 
learned to appreciate all that the older Ger- 
many stood for. But facts must be recog- 
nized, no matter how painful such recogni- 

29 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

tion may be. Nor can personal attachment 
deter us from realizing the full significance 
of the moral issue, as also the necessity, for 
the sake of Germany as well as for the world, 
of fighting it out until the causes that have 
brought about the issue shall have been re- 
moved. No truer and no more penetrating 
word was ever spoken than the insistence by 
the President of this Republic, on various 
occasions, upon the distinction to be made 
between the German government and the 
German people. On the surface, to be sure, 
no such distinction exists or can exist, for 
in fighting this moral issue, our forces are 
necessarily directed against the people who 
constitute the armies of Germany. It must 
also be admitted, as will be shown further 
on, that the system of government which 
has created the moral issue has affected the 
mental calibre of the people living under 
such a system and their outlook on life, but 
the recognition of this fact furnishes merely 
further proof for the contention that if we 

30 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

probe beneath the surface we will find the 
ultimate reason for the conflict to lie in the 
character of the government and not in the 
character of the people, for it is this govern- 
ment which stands out as the embodiment of 
material power, and not the people. It is 
this government that by placing force be- 
hind national ambitions has directly created 
the moral issue. It is a fact, therefore, that 
what we are really fighting are the evil 
forces let loose through the system of gov- 
ernment prevailing in Germany. It is this 
system which has by a logical sequence led to 
Germany's conduct of the war in defiance 
of all humanitarian considerations, as well 
as frequent disregard of the postulates of 
international law. This system spells force ; 
it translates the policy of a people into terms 
of force. It is a system which does not rea- 
son or argue; it points to the sword as its 
first and last appeal. Such a system natur- 
ally mocks at all moral considerations. It 
brushes them aside as the sickly fancies of 

31 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

impractical dreamers. A system which is 
symbolized by a military machine, perfected 
to do its work with unerring precision, rec- 
ognizes no law except that underlying its 
own being. Germany's conduct of the war 
is in consistent accord with the system ; and 
when I speak of her conduct, I do not mean 
merely — though I do mean primarily — the 
recourse to such mediaeval practices as the 
taking and shooting of hostages, and such 
primitive barbarities as wholesale deporta- 
tions — the favorite policy of the old Assyr- 
ian conquerors — and all the varied barbari- 
ties in her method of warfare. I do not mean 
merely terrorizing the inhabitants of in- 
vaded districts by wanton acts of destruc- 
tion to serve as warnings. I include also 
the elaborate spy system so carefully organ- 
ized that its branches, like the net-work of 
an ugly spider, reach in all directions. I in- 
clude the insidious propaganda, which has 
assumed enormous dimensions; I include 
the sinister intrigues and the rhetorical cam- 

32 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

ouflage of the military and diplomatic pol- 
icy, until the atmosphere becomes so thick 
with insidious deception that when an official 
utterance comes from Germany the world no 
longer takes such an utterance at its face 
value but seeks for some hidden meaning. 
It almost takes for granted that when Ger- 
many speaks through her Chancellor, she 
does not mean what she says, but something 
else. All this is a direct outcome of the sys- 
tem, and an inherent part of it ; and it is evi- 
dent that the condition of affairs thus called 
into being removes the basis for any under- 
standing between Germany and the other 
nations. It intensifies a hundred-fold the 
definition of the diplomat of the old school, 
who was described as a person sent abroad 
to lie for his country. The world cannot 
breathe freely in such an atmosphere, poi- 
soned by the asphyxiating gases of dissem- 
blance and deception. Cruelty and dishon- 
esty thus become the corollary expressions 
of a system of government which finds its 

3 33 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

sole support in force — and cruelty and dis- 
honesty are immoral forces that must be re- 
moved at all hazards before the world can 
again pursue the even tenor of its way. 

The present conflict, therefore, I urge, is 
primarily a moral issue, a determination to 
strike at the root of the evil which has pro- 
duced the present calamitous condition of 
the world. That root is a system of govern- 
ment out of keeping with the stage of moral 
development that the world has reached. In 
saying this, one is far from implying that the 
other nations of the world, including our- 
selves, have a clean bill of moral health. In 
fighting for the moral issue that I am try- 
ing to define, we are not putting ourselves 
on an eminence, with a claim to moral per- 
fection, nor are we assuming the attitude of 
a supreme judge sitting in judgment over 
a nation. We are simply giving voice to the 
present-day conscience of humanity — a 
voice that is also heard in Germany, though 
not as yet with sufficient strength — a voice 

34 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

which is determined to abolish a system for 
which there is no room, even in a world like 
ours, so far removed as yet from moral per- 
fection. Aye, just because we recognize 
how far we still are from the goal of more 
perfect justice, towards which one hopes that 
mankind is aiming and striving, do we feel 
the supreme importance of fighting for the 
triumph of the cause which has carried us 
into the war. 

For I hold that it is this moral issue which 
has led us, step by step, until the time seemed 
ripe to take the final leap which landed us 
into the midst of the conflict. There are 
those, probably many, who feel that this step 
should have been taken earlier. But here 
again, if we have regard for the undercur- 
rents instead of being carried away by sole 
consideration for surface events, there seems 
to have been a good reason why we entered 
the war at the time that we did and not 
earlier. The moral issue was foreshadowed, 
as has been pointed out, by Germany's 

35 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

breaking her solemn obligation given to 
Belgium. From the point of view of 1917 
that becomes perfectly clear, but the moral 
issue was not crystallized until the war had 
proceeded far enough to reveal the aim of 
the military clique in control in Germany, 
in all its danger to the safety of the world. 
The significance of our entrance is all the 
greater because it came at a moment when 
the original aspect of the war had been en- 
tirely changed, and it had definitely become 
what it is to-day, a fight against the evil 
forces let loose through the military system, 
dominant in Germany. Even the vengeance 
for a wrong inflicted, which may prompt a 
people to rise in its wrath, is given a higher 
sanction when it is put in the service of a 
great cause affecting all mankind. 

Our entry as a mighty people, bound by 
its traditions to peace and not to war, a 
nation pacifist by nature and by its convic- 
tions, solemnizes the war because of the 
moral issue involved. The spirit in which 

36 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

we have entered the war further illustrates 
that issue. Think of the thousands of men 
and women who have left their ordinary 
tasks, many at considerable sacrifice, to de- 
vote themselves to humanitarian service — 
to carry the wounded from the battle-field, 
to win them back to health, or to give them 
such aid as is possible in their dying hours ; 
to assist in restoring what the engines of war 
have destroyed, to maintain the morale and 
the courage of those facing the dangers and 
hardships of the trenches. Even before we 
formally entered upon the war, these volun- 
teers by the hundreds and thousands came 
from every side, inspired in most cases bjr 
the deathless courage of France and Belgium 
— because France and Belgium stood up for 
the moral issue and faced annihilation at the 
hands of a strong, almost invincible, foe 
rather than yield to a system which refused 
to be bound by moral considerations. These 
volunteers, many of them entering as sol- 
diers into the armies of a nation not their 

37 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

own, were the advance guards of the large 
force which is now being gathered to swell 
the ranks of those who are taking their stand 
as the bulwarks against the encroachment of 
power — to hold the line that means the safe- 
guarding of liberty and of civilization. This 
enthusiasm, more particularly for France, 
which is as marked as it is sincere, is a symp- 
tom of the recognition of the moral issue 
involved in the war. It is not prompted 
merely by gratitude for what France did 
for this country during our struggle for lib- 
erty and independence, for only a few of 
those who volunteered can be directly con- 
scious of any such feeling. Nor is it merely 
love for France, strong and deep as that 
feeling is in this country, for many of the 
volunteers have never known that country, 
nor prior to the war had any special rela- 
tions with it. No, the movement was, pri- 
marily, a response to the aroused conscience 
of mankind to bring about the triumph of 
the moral issue involved in the war. Men 

38 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

and women have been moved to come to the 
aid of France in this war from the same 
feeling that led idealistic Frenchmen to come 
to our aid 140 years ago. In both cases the 
moral issue was the impelling factor, and 
that factor dominates the readiness to self- 
sacrifice shown by all classes of citizens 
throughout the countiy — aye, the anxiety 
of all to help, each in his or her way, in the 
great cause which has so completely trans- 
formed the life of this country within the 
short span of a year. The business man, 
from the magnate to the clerk, has left his 
office; the lawyer has closed his desk; the 
doctor has given up his practice; the teacher 
his class-room; the clergyman his pulpit — 
all to give themselves up to public service. 
Thousands upon thousands had volunteered 
their services in the army and navy before 
the draft was promulgated. Women of all 
ranks and women everywhere have aban- 
doned thoughts of self to throw themselves 
into relief work. Their hands are busy from 

39 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

morning to night to provide comfort for 
the fighters and aid for the wounded. 

Let us not underestimate the meaning of 
this remarkable demonstration, nor in a 
cynical spirit pick out instances of selfish 
interest or the love of adventure that in 
some cases may have been contributing fac- 
tors. We are witnessing a great movement 
and a movement that needs to be interpreted 
by a worthy motive. Is it patriotism? Yes, 
but not that alone. Back of patriotism — 
perhaps unconscious to many — is the feeling 
of the higher cause involved in the war, a 
cause higher than mere preservation of self, 
higher even than mere preservation of one's 
country. That deeper cause animating the 
entire movement of the war can be no other, 
it seems to me, than the aroused conscience 
of mankind, not to take vengeance, not to 
crush or destroy a nation, but to crush and 
destroy a system that represents an evil 
force — a force that is destroying the nation 
that it holds in its grasp, destroying and 

40 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

crushing that nation as effectively — aye, 
even more so — than the armies of the world 
drawn up against the monstrous alliance be- 
tween power and national policy. We are 
fighting for a principle, for the overthrow 
of a system that links national policies with 
power as the means of carrying them out. 
That principle needs to be established not 
merely to insure our own safety, but to in- 
sure the world against another outbreak 
such as the one that has now plunged man- 
kind in deepest grief and suffering for al- 
most four years. The moral issue involved 
in this war against the abuse of power offers 
the strongest support to the cause in which 
we are engaged, and the firmest assurance, 
also, of its ultimate triumph. 

Ill 

But the question may well be raised as a 
challenge to this proposition: Have not all 
the nations of the past and present, includ- 
ing our own, been made by war, by the ex- 

41 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

ercise of power? Has not the world always 
been dominated by force? Is there any great 
nation that has not pushed its way by the 
exercise of material power, often brushing 
aside the weaker which stood as an obstacle 
in the way? This is undoubtedly true. But 
note the verdict of history on all attempts 
to carry the policy of force beyond very 
definite bounds. " Die Weltgeschichte ist 
das Weltgericht," says Schiller. History is 
the supreme judge that has invariably pro- 
nounced the doom when even what is right 
makes a definite alliance with might, and 
depends upon power to carry out its aims. 

Let us take, as perhaps the most striking 
example, the imperialistic policy of Rome. 
At the outset of her career the spirit of 
Rome was inherently opposed to the idea of 
conquest. Rome grew by natural expansion, 
and the fundamental principle of that ex- 
pansion was not domination over increasing 
territory, but the extension of the scope of 
Roman citizenship. Even when Rome 

42 



THE|WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

passed beyond her natural borders, and 
stretched her grasp over lands lying outside, 
to the Spanish Peninsula on the West, to 
Africa on the South, to the Greek cities and 
to Asia Minor on the East, it was done in 
part, as the Carthaginian wars show, in self- 
defense against hostile and insidious neigh- 
bors, and in part in response to appeals of 
weaker nations and states to Rome, to come 
to their support against encroachment on 
their domain on the part of ambitious and 
stronger enemies. Recent investigations of 
Roman imperialism 3 have shown that it is 
not until we reach the days of Julius Caesar, 
when Rome had already become mistress of 
the eastern world by her broad and unselfish 
policy, that the spirit of domination by 
forcible conquest replaces the earlier policy 
of logical and natural expansion under the 
guiding principle of extending the scope of 

3 See the admirable and splendidly written work 
of Prof. Tenney Frank, " Roman Imperialism " 
(New York, 191 4). 

43 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

Roman citizenship, without crushing the in- 
dependent spirit of those nations that came 
under Rome's jurisdiction. Caesar marks 
the beginning of a new era, the attempt to 
force the Roman idea upon the world; but 
Cassar also points to the beginning of Rome's 
decline, which Gibbon significantly dates 
from the accession of Augustus. The new 
Rome succeeds in dominating the world, but 
at the cost of becoming, by virtue of her 
policy of forcible conquest, a menace that 
leads by the logical force of events to the 
division of the Empire, and eventually to 
the formation of independent states in north- 
ern and southern Europe. The underlying 
theory of the Roman Empire and the idea 
upon which it rested was a magnificent and 
inspiring one, to confer the benefits of 
Roman citizenship, " the heir of all the 
ages," upon the whole world. It actually 
did confer many of those benefits, despite 
the spirit of domination which set in, but 
when Rome enthroned power as the perma- 

44 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

nent head of the pantheon she committed the 
cardinal sin which led to her own undoing. 
Napoleon, only a century removed from 
our day, furnishes an equally striking illus- 
tration of the theme. That great and illus- 
trious figure comes forward as a liberating 
force in Europe. As his armies swept 
through Europe, they carried with them the 
ideas of the French Revolution, the estab- 
lishment of the sovereignty of a people in 
place of the domination of an autocratic 
group over a people. The Russian cam- 
paign, disastrous as it was for Napoleon, 
laid the seed for the movement that in our 
own days germinated in the liberation of 
Russia, first from serfdom and recently 
from official thraldom; and yet Napoleon, 
yielding to the temptation to join might 
with right, and making this combination the 
very foundation of his policy, became the 
greatest danger to the freedom and to the 
free life of the European nations, who were 
forced to combine against him for his over- 

45 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

throw. The issue in the Napoleonic wars 
was at bottom likewise a moral one. 

But, someone will object, how about 
Great Britain? Has she not also followed 
an imperialistic policy? Now, imperialism 
as it actually appears in the world's history 
is not all of one color. Its shades vary from 
the dark hue of the Assyrian-Babylonian 
policy, to dominate the world by crushing 
the independent life of the nations subdued, 
to the brighter shade of the humane policy 
of the Persian kings led by Cyrus. Cyrus 
reversed the process and granted a large 
measure of autonomy for the unfolding of 
national life among the peoples over whom 
he exercised a supervisory control. Persian 
imperialism approached the idea of a federa- 
tion of nations under a unit control, though 
naturally it was far removed from the mod- 
ern aspect of such a federation. It was 
Assyria whose example was followed by the 
later Babylonian empire that introduced the 
cruel principle of deporting the best and 

46 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

most useful elements of a conquered popu- 
lation, so as to prevent a resuscitation of the 
national spirit. S argon, the Assyrian, and 
Nebuchadnezzar, the Babylonian, as the 
representatives of dominating imperialism, 
deported the Jews to the Euphrates Valley 
and elsewhere. C} r rus permitted them to 
return as an expression of his more liberal 
imperialistic policy. Greek imperialism, 
associated with Alexander the Great, was 
largely a cultural movement, bringing about 
an exchange between Greek and Oriental 
ideas that led, as one of the results of this 
commingling, to Christianity. Rome in her 
earlier days followed along the path mapped 
out by Cyrus and Alexander the Great, 
while Great Britain may be instanced as an 
illustration of carrying on an imperialistic 
policy which, while it does contain features 
that cannot endure the strict ethical test, has 
nevertheless avoided the pitfalls which 
Roman and Napoleonic imperialism en- 
countered. England's expansion, prompted 

47 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

by her position as an island power, has not 
been carried on under the protection of an 
elaborate military system. It could not, of 
course, have been carried on without power, 
but that power has been kept within bounds. 4 
England's policy has generally been tem- 
pered by a readiness to preserve the national 
life of those who came under her domina- 

4 Lord Acton in one of his letters, recently pub- 
lished, " Selections from the Correspondence of the 
First Lord Acton," vol. i, page 249, shows the dis- 
tinction to be made between Navalism used by an 
island power as a means of defense and retaining 
control of possessions, and a military system which 
by its very presence spells domination. " A fleet 
with an army is an instrument of militarism. A 
fleet without one is not." It is a significant index of 
the aggressive character of Germany's military Im- 
perialism, that in addition to already having the most 
powerful army, she was also determined to have a 
powerful navy. This meant Navalism plus Militar- 
ism, and naturally helped to bring on the crisis by 
increasing suspicion of Germany's ulterior designs. 
Lord Cromer, in his penetrating analysis of "Ancient 
and Modern Imperialism " (London, 1910), points 
out the general agreement between British Imperial- 
ism and the earlier policy of Rome. 
48 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

tion. She went beyond legitimate bounds 
in two instances and paid dearly for it. 
One was her treatment of Ireland, the result 
of which has cost her such infinite trouble, 
and the other was the fatal mistake that she 
made in endeavoring to force her will upon 
the American colonies, and which cost her 
the allegiance of these colonies. But, on the 
other hand, Great Britain has in two recent 
instances furnished a notable example of an 
imperialistic policy conducted along higher 
lines, that form a parallel to Persian and to 
the earlier Roman imperialism before it be- 
came pure conquest and domination. In 
South Africa she has given a pledge of good 
faith by according to the Boers the fullest 
measure of political liberty; and in Egypt 
by the exercise of a wise protectorate she 
has brought about a marvelous transforma- 
tion in economic conditions in that country, 
suggesting the resuscitation of the great 
prosperity that characterized the Nile Val- 
ley in ancient times. British imperialism 

4 49 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

has moved rapidly within our days towards 
a great Federalized Empire, allowing full- 
est scope for the development of the various 
states and divisions, and with no thought of 
subjugation of dependent peoples. 

The parallel, however, suggested by Ger- 
many's policy is that with Csesarian imper- 
ialism, and the particular point in the par- 
allel to which attention should be drawn is 
the totally different aspect given to a na- 
tional policy the moment the attempt is 
made to enforce it by the appeal to sheer 
power or through the threat of force. Such 
an appeal or threat is in order only in self- 
defense, to protect the national frontiers of 
a nation, or to ward off a threatened attack ; 
but when it is made for the deliberate pur- 
pose of aiding territorial or political expan- 
sion, to be carried out even at the expense 
of the claims or liberties of others, a moral 
issue invariably arises which must be fought 
out to the finish. The ambition of Germany 
to spread her commerce, to capture the mar- 

50 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

kets of the world for the products of her 
industries, was not only perfectly legitimate 
but one that under ordinary circumstances 
would have benefited the world as well as 
herself. Taking even the main aim of Pan- 
Germanism, the control of the highway 
across Asia Minor, and regarding it as the 
means of opening up an important region 
of the world that has in the past played so 
notable a part in the world's history, and we 
must in a just and impartial spirit com- 
mend not only the main project of a railway 
connecting two poles of the East, Constan- 
tinople and Bagdad, a project of the same 
large vision as the cutting of the Suez and 
Panama Canals, but we may also recognize 
the great benefits of such an enterprise 
towards the resuscitation of the ancient 
East. An English writer 5 has recently 
called the project " a great conception 

5 J. A. R. Marriott, " The Eastern Question, An 
Historical Study in European Diplomacy " (Oxford, 
1917), page 359- 

51 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

worthy of a scientific and systematic peo- 
ple." But note how the project becomes a 
veritable curse the moment that a powerful 
government steps behind it and attempts to 
use it, by the threat of militarism, for a po- 
litical domination of the East which neces- 
sarily could only be carried out at the 
cost of the interests of the sister nations 
of the world. 6 

Such a policy of domination, which would 
be intolerable no matter by what nation it 
would be attempted, is again a logical out- 
come of a system of government which 
recognizes force as its main prop, and which 
is built up on a foundation of force. If 
Pan-Germanism had arisen from a natural 
need of expansion, it would have been kept 
within the bounds proper to such an expan- 
sion. The movement might have been of 
inestimable benefit to the world in general 

6 See the further discussion of this point in the 
author's " The War and the Bagdad Railway," 
pages 117 et seq. 

52 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

as well as to Germany, if it had led, let us 
say, in order to provide an outlet for a rap- 
idly growing population, to the establish- 
ment of colonies in various parts of the 
world, with due consideration for the rights 
of those already inhabiting the regions to be 
colonized. But Pan-Germanism proceeded 
on the theory that the power of Germany 
must be extended; that Germany was to 
occupy a more prominent place in the sun, 
to use the phrase of her former Chancellor. 
It was power and always power, and noth- 
ing but power, that was urged in connection 
with the national policy. The expansionist 
movement was linked to the military system 
of government, until it became a mere ap- 
pendage to that system, with the result that 
Pan-Germanism shares with the military 
system the condemnation expressed in the 
revolt of the world against domination 
through such a system. This aspect of Pan- 
Germanism removes what force there might 
otherwise rest in the claim of those who may 

53 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

be regarded as the intellectual satellites of 
the movement, that Germany by her na- 
tional policy was actuated by a benevolent 
desire to give the rest of the world the bene- 
fit of her civilization, to spread the German 
" Kultur," to use the conventional phrase, 
throughout the world, just as the Greeks 
scattered Greek civilization through the con- 
quest of Alexander the Great, and as Rome 
wished to extend the benefits and privileges 
of Roman citizenship through her imperial- 
ism to the entire world. How can the mod- 
ern world take kindly to a civilization that is 
to be forced upon it by the sword? How 
can mankind be expected to judge that civi- 
lization, when preached by the utter disre- 
gard of the sanctity of treaties and by the 
justification of cruelties and barbarities on 
the ground of their being military measures, 
as anything else but a thin disguise for im- 
posing in reality the authority of Germany 
upon the world? A country extends the in- 
fluence of her civilization by the teachings 

54 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

in her schools and her universities, by the 
writings of her scholars, by the works of her 
artists, by the spread of her manufactures, 
by the examples of her citizens in the con- 
duct of their lives, and by the spirit of her 
institutions. The spread of Greek civiliza- 
tion did not mean imposing the Greek cul- 
ture upon the world, but a commingling of 
the cultural currents of the East and the 
West. Greek imperialism carried with it 
an exchange of ideas and of ideals, not the 
substitution of one civilization for all the 
others to satisfy the national conceit of a 
people, carried away by the delusion that the 
civilization of the world must be of one hue. 
German civilization with its lights and 
shades is an outcome of the development of 
the Germanic spirit along specific lines and 
under definite restrictions. It is not acci- 
dental that Germany, as Brandes well puts 
it, has remained a center of conservatism in 
the middle of Europe, clinging to outgrown 
theories of the State, bound to mediaeval 

55 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

traditions of sovereignty and opposed to the 
new international spirit that within the past 
century has swept throughout the world, but 
has passed Germany by. German civiliza- 
tion shows the results of an exaggerated 
emphasis on nationalism. The very insist- 
ence of her leaders upon the superiority of 
her cultural achievements reveals as one of 
her serious defects the hostility to the larger 
international view. Granting, therefore, the 
sincerity of her intellectuals in their advo- 
cacy of the crusade for German civilization 
as the primary factor behind the national 
policy of conquest and domination, that ad- 
vocacy merely reveals the wilful blindness 
or the incapacity of her men of science to 
realize that what they are endeavoring to 
bring about is the spread of power, not of 
civilization. The German professors are 
merely supplying the theoretic support for 
the military ambitions of the class that at 
present controls the destinies of the country. 
They are merely strengthening by their 

56 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

attitude the tight grasp of the military 
autocracy upon the people, that wishes 
to strangle all independence of political 
thought and endeavor. The cry of a crusade 
for German " Kultur " is thus degraded to 
the low level of a decoy by the unholy 
alliance between power and national policy. 
Indeed, in the light of Belgium and the 
sinking of the Lusitania with its cargo of 
innocent noncombatants, it is not surprising 
(though exceedingly sad) to find German 
civilization held up as a mockery and a by- 
word. The combination of military power 
with cultural aims leads to a travesty of 
genuine " Kultur." The attempt to justify 
military domination by an appeal to eco- 
nomic policy, further supported by an erro- 
neous theory of the method of spreading civi- 
lization, serves only to intensify the serious- 
ness of the menace to the world involved in 
the special brand of German imperialism; 
and clarifies the moral issue that underlies 
the war. From whatever angle, therefore, 

57 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

we view the conflict, whether from the point 
of view of Germany's conduct of the war, or 
from the point of view of Pan-Germanistic 
policy, which became bound up with the mili- 
tary system, or from the point of view advo- 
cated by her misguided intellectual leaders 
who play into the hands of the military au- 
tocracy and of Pan-Germanism, we reach 
the same conclusion, that in the final analysis 
the issue in this war is a moral one. 

IV 

The moral issue has transformed a natur- 
ally pacifist nation in the course of the past 
year into a people in arms. Even those 
whose instincts, training and deeper convic- 
tions would prompt them to protest against 
war as in itself an immoral force — and I 
number myself among those who feel that 
war involves a temporary lapse into bar- 
barism, since war cannot be looked upon as 
anything else than a survival of barbaric 
times — yet nevertheless feel that they must 

58 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

conquer a natural repugnance to war in 
order to array themselves on the side of those 
fighting for a moral issue. The moral issue 
makes this war what has been called the 
" pacifist's war," 7 for it is a war against the 
martial spirit that lurks inevitably in a 
purely military system of government. The 
moral issue — the fight against the assertion 
of force in carrying out national ambitions 
— involves in its ultimate triumph the re- 
moval of the causes that produce wars. 

It is from this same point of view that we 
must approach the corollary to the war, the 
problem of peace when the issue shall have 
been won. But before taking this up, let 
us consider two questions that confront us 
when we turn to a closer analysis of the 
moral issue. What is the basis or justifica- 
tion for our designating the fight against 
the domination of power as a moral conflict, 



7 See an article " A Pacifist Defense of America's 
War," by Joseph Jastrow, in The North American 
Review for August, 1917. 
59 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

and, secondly, how was it possible for a peo- 
ple of great achievements, that stands out 
prominently in the domain of intellectual 
activity, a people with a great literature and 
a long list of thinkers, a people full of senti- 
ment in their domestic lives, and not bellig- 
erent by nature — how was it possible for 
them to become involved in the issue which 
now confronts the world? 

There are thinkers of recognized eminence 
who sincerely believe that the unfolding of 
power is the proper goal of mankind, sug- 
gested by nature in which power seems to 
be a controlling force. The stronger animal 
overcomes the weaker; the storm sweeps 
along and brings havoc to whatever is not 
strong enough to resist its attack. A battle 
is decided ultimately by superior strength, 
in combination, to be sure, with strategy, 
which, however, is merely the means of using 
power to the best advantage. Even in the 
domain of religion, power exercises its force. 
The gods in primitive and in many advanced 

60 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

religions of antiquity were viewed primarily 
as embodiments or symbols of strength. 
Until the threshold of modern times, re- 
ligions were spread by means of power. 
Islam glorifies the sword as the medium of 
enforcing the Koran. Intolerance and per- 
secution, which fill many pages in the history 
of Christianity, are corollaries to the recog- 
nition of power as one of the allies of re- 
ligion in providing for the spiritual needs of 
man. In ancient Hebrew and in many other 
languages, the general term for God means 
" the strong one." One of the common titles 
in the Old Testament given to the God of 
the Hebrews was " The Lord of Hosts," as 
the leader of armies. Nature seems to pro- 
claim that the mighty shall inherit the world, 
and history often appears to justify the 
claim that to the victor belongs the spoils. 

Now the answer to all this is simple. If 
we believe that man's destiny is to follow 
along the lines mapped out by nature, there 
is hardly any escape from the philosophy, so 



61 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

commonly associated with Nietzsche, that 
the will to power is the ultimate goal of hu- 
manity, and that such religions as Judaism, 
Christianity and Buddhism, in setting up 
high ethical ideals as the flowering expres- 
sion of religious belief, and inculcating the 
necessity of ethics at the sacrifice of power 
and of victory, run counter to the laws of 
nature. And yet Nietzsche himself, that 
profound and unhappy thinker, so con- 
stantly upheld as the advocate of might over 
right, furnishes the corrective to the per- 
nicious doctrine. A thorough student and 
able expounder of Nietzsche's philosophy 
has, in a recent volume, 8 set forth Nietzsche's 
<k superman " in its correct light. The 
theory of the " superman " represents, in a 
measure, the climax of Nietzsche's philoso- 
phy; but the superman is the one who is 
supreme because he has conquered power. 
He stands above power, he is beyond good 

8 W. M. Salter, " Nietzsche, The Thinker " (New 
York, 1917), Chapter XXVII. 
62 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

and evil, because he dwells in a world in 
which he is no longer engaged in a struggle 
between two opposing forces. He is 
triumphant because he has no fear. The 
superman is merely the symbol of the highest 
perfection, and perfection must be without 
weakness as well as without fear. The 
superman represents the triumph of the 
ideal, and it is merely the fondness of 
Nietzsche for paradox, and his distaste for 
cant, hypocrisy and mawkish sentimental- 
ism, that leads him to suggest the identifica- 
tion of his idea of a superman with power. 
Nietzsche never evolved a system of phi- 
losophy; he merely gave utterance to spo- 
radic thoughts, often in a semi-mystic guise. 
If we strip his philosophy of paradoxes and 
inconsistencies — and the man who is fond 
of paradox is rarely consistent — we see that 
in its essence his philosophy recognizes the 
inherent opposition between the course of 
nature and the course of civilization. Civi- 
lization is essentially a struggle against 

63 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

nature. Man's impulse towards the im- 
provement of his condition brings him at 
every turn into conflict with nature. Human 
progress is the triumph of man over the 
forces of nature hostile to him when he tries 
to oppose them. Hence as man advances, 
he endows his gods with attributes that are 
contrary to nature. These gods are no 
longer the strong, the mighty leaders in bat- 
tle. They are pictured as open to mercy, 
which is the willingness to make an excep- 
tion to inexorable pitiless law. They are 
viewed as open to pity, which involves a 
modification in the law. The quality of love 
is attributed to them, which means the sub- 
stitution of grace for law. This movement 
in the field of religion, totally changing the 
character of the old nature gods by giving 
them attributes that are not found in nature, 
but which reflect man's own ethical advance 
in opposing nature — this movement culmi- 
nated in the strange yet impressive doctrine 
of God himself making a sacrifice of what 

64 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

was dearest to him, in order to save mankind 
from eternal damnation through the force 
of law, which demanded that sin must be 
followed by punishment and cannot be 
wiped out. The natural condition thus be- 
comes reversed, as man proceeds in his up- 
ward course. All those forces which stand 
opposed to power — and nature is the very 
synonym of power — are moved into the fore- 
ground. Progress is the challenge thrown 
down to nature viewed as power, the strug- 
gle against forces symbolizing might, and 
which, therefore, from this point of view be- 
come forces of evil. 

It has always seemed to me, in my studies 
of the religious evolution of mankind, that 
in one respect at least the religion founded 
by Zoroaster, in the sixth centuiy before 
our era, penetrated more deeply into the 
mysteiy of the struggle of man against 
nature than any other, by positing two 
forces in control of the world, a power of 
good, and a power of evil. The power of 

5 65 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

good was Ahuramazda, the " resplendent in 
light " ; the power of evil was Ahriman, the 
" dark." Zoroaster, in reaching out to a 
conception of divine government of the uni- 
verse, logically and in a humane spirit, as- 
sumed that the supreme god, ruling his 
creatures by love, justice and mercy, could 
not be held responsible for the evil, the in- 
justice and the suffering in this world; and 
so Zoroaster boldly proclaimed that Ahura- 
mazda, the highest and good god, possesses 
all attributes except one. Ahuramazda was 
omniscient — but not all powerful. The 
forces of evil were under the control of an 
independent power which he called Ahri- 
man. With this power Ahuramazda was 
represented as being in constant conflict, 
in the hope that eventually, after aeons upon 
aeons, the good will overcome the evil and 
become also all powerful as well as omnis- 
cient. It is not accidental that Nietzsche, 
attracted by this doctrine, chose to put 
some of his finest thoughts into the mouth 

66 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

of Zoroaster in the volume which he en- 
titled, " Thus Spake Zarathustra." When 
Nietzsche, therefore, makes Zoroaster 
preach the superman, it is the Super-God, 
the god who has overcome evil, that Niet- 
zsche has in mind. Human history is the 
struggle of Ahuramazda against Ahriman 
— the higher forces in deadly conflict with 
the forces of evil. Nature, in so far as it 
symbolizes power, represents Ahriman ; and 
civilization, in so far as it aims to establish 
a higher principle in the world in place of 
power, is Ahuramazda. 

V 

Militarism, the very embodiment of 
power, making its appeal to power, and 
knowing no other weapon than power, thus 
becomes an evil force fatal to progress, as it is 
hostile to humanitarianism. The unfolding 
of civilization resolves itself into a process 
of substituting for power a factor of a higher 
order, one destined eventually to overcome 
67 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

power. And yet here is the ugly fact that 
as nations grow — and growth is necessary 
to a people — they also grow in power. The 
tendency is towards expansion, towards an 
extension of power in one direction or the 
other. What, then, is the safeguard against 
the abuse of power ? How can the ambitions 
of a nation be kept within bounds so as to 
avoid the danger of an alliance with power 
as the chief, or, worse still, as the sole means 
to carry out these ambitions ? The examples 
of Rome and Germany point the way along 
which danger lies, and they also point the 
way out. Power in the control of a group, 
holding the people in its grasp by means of 
military machinery, leads on the one hand 
to the principle of government over a people 
and to issues against which sooner or later 
the moral conscience of mankind rises in 
protest and opposition; and on the other 
hand, such a group ruling by power will 
necessarily be led to make a military system 
its main support in carrying out a national 

68 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

policy. The two aspects of power, power 
over a people and power as the ally of na- 
tional life, go hand in hand. These two 
aspects combined produce the menace that 
eventually forces the world to arm. 

The fight against power is always a moral 
issue, and the triumph over power a moral 
victory. A menace, to be sure, may also 
arise when the power is conferred upon a 
group by a whole people. A nation, ruling 
its own destinies, may be bitten by the mili- 
taristic spirit of domination or conquest, 
but the danger is far less likely to arise. 
The saner and finer instincts in a nation will 
be apt to assert themselves against such an 
immoral alliance between power and na- 
tional policies. The moral sense of the 
masses will rebel against the temptation to 
ride rough-shod over the claims of sister 
nations. The feelings of a common human- 
ity are more likely to manifest themselves 
and to bring about a counter movement to a 
course, which the more far-sighted leaders in 

69 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

the nation will see to be driving a people to 
its own undoing, by arousing first the sus- 
picion, then the distrust, and finally the hos- 
tility of the world. The road along which 
danger lies is more likely to be avoided before 
it is too late, and at all events the people 
have it in their hands to call a halt when the 
danger becomes apparent. But with power 
in the control of a group, using its power 
to maintain its hold over a people, bringing 
about a system of government that is im- 
posed upon a people and that does not re- 
ceive its mandate from them — under such 
circumstances, the legitimate bounds to the 
extension of a people's power will by the 
logical force of events be overstepped. The 
people are powerless, and it is only a ques- 
tion of time before the combination of 
power with national policy will lead to a 
menace in which the essential issue will al- 
ways be found to be a moral one. 

It is worthy of note, also, that those 
periods in human history in which power is 

70 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

invoked as the main support for carrying out 
national ambitions are not the ones marked 
by the best or the highest of human achieve- 
ments. Rome was at her intellectual height 
before she entered upon the ruthless course 
of conquest and domination in Caesar's days, 
despite the glamor that her success in arms 
threw over her widely extended dominions. 
Egypt produced her best works of art and 
literature before the extension of her domin- 
ions into Asia; and Assyria, the greatest 
military power of antiquity, was not a cul- 
tural force. Napoleon's regime led to a de- 
cline in France's prestige — fortunately only 
of a temporary character. It certainly can- 
not be said that the Germany after 1888 
is greater in its intellectual achievements 
than the old Germany. George Brandes, 
whom I have quoted, comments sadly on the 
fact that a decline in liberal thought set in 
in Germany after the union of German 
States in 1870. " The old men of this gen- 
eration," says Brandes, " are the young 

71 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

spirits, inspired with high ideals, while the 
young men have linked themselves largely 
to reactionary ideas." Material prosperity 
and the growth of the political power of 
Germany during the past quarter of a cen- 
tury have not produced as many great 
names, either in literature, in philosophy or 
even in scholarship, as the period before 
1870. The great era of philosophy in Ger- 
many set in with Kant, who appears at a 
time when there was no thought of a greater 
Germany. Goethe and Schiller flourished 
at a time when the German people lived 
under the shadow of Napoleonic domination, 
and Heine, the poet of freedom, sings his 
immortal songs while the people were strug- 
gling for independence. Warnings against 
the dangers inherent in the building up of 
a great military machine have been raised 
in Germany itself during the past two de- 
cades. The burden of Maximilian Harden's 
messages in his periodical, Die Zukunft, 
has been a steady protest against the po- 

72 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

litical road along which Germany has been 
travelling since the accession of the present 
emperor. About ten years ago a novel ap- 
peared in Germany which created a pro- 
found impression and was most widely read. 
Its title was, " Jena or Sedan," and it boldly 
raised the question, which was better for 
Germany, the defeat at Jena or the victory 
of Sedan. The entire aim of the novel was 
to show the disintegrating effect of mili- 
tarism on the ideals of the country and 
as exemplified within the ranks of the army 
itself. Many of the dramas produced in 
Germany during the decade preceding the 
war dealt with problems arising out of the 
military system; and the problems were in- 
variably of a tragic character that revealed 
the purpose of the author to show the harsh- 
ness and brutality of the system. 

Such facts enable us to understand how 
it was possible that a nation that in every 
other respect, except in the supremacy of 
the militaristic spirit, stands for progress, 

73 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

should have been led, by the subtle influence 
of a military domination over the life of the 
people, to become chained to power as the 
strongest aid in carrying out the national 
aims. Therein lies Germany's fatal error, 
her sin against the moral law which presides 
over mankind's efforts to overcome the hos- 
tile forces of nature. The alliance between 
militarism and civilization is an unholy one. 
It forms a parallel to the combination of the 
Sword with the Koran as the means of prop- 
agating Islam, and which has similarly been 
the fatal moral error of that great religion. 
The combination of power with national 
aims means employing Ahriman, the power 
of evil, to bring about the triumph of Ahura- 
mazda, the force making for betterment and 
for moral growth. 

It is precisely this unfortunate combina- 
tion that has prevented Germany from pass- 
ing, as all other nations have passed, from 
the principle of government over a people 
to that of government by a people. A mili- 
tary system of government arises either as 

74 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

the expression of autocracy and becomes the 
means of perpetuating autocracy, or the sys- 
tem leads to autocracy. There are examples 
for both processes in human history. In the 
case of Germany, autocracy created the sys- 
tem. In the case of Rome, the system led to 
autocracy. The result, however, is in both 
cases the same. We obtain, as the theory 
of the State, government over the people 
instead of government by the people. 

VI 

The moral issue involved in the war is 
accentuated by the strange fact that Ger- 
many, alone of modern nations, has not 
realized the trend of modern history since 
the close of the 18th century. She has not 
heeded the message which rang out clearly 
when the shot was fired at Lexington 
" heard round the world." That volley 
sounded the death-knell of the old system 
which set up as its principle that govern- 
ment exists for the development of power 
and for controlling a people by the aid of 

75 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

that power. It proclaimed the new prin- 
ciple, that the State was not an abstract 
symbol of power, but a concrete expression 
of the will of the people, and that national 
policies are to be developed and carried out 
by the sovereign will of the people, not by 
a group acting autocratically on behalf of 
the people. The French Revolution is the 
echo of the American War for Independ- 
ence and established the same principle of 
government through the people for the 
guidance of Europe. Napoleon's armies 
carried the message to Italy, to Germany, 
to Austria, to Russia, and to the East. The 
revolution of 1848 in Germany, the estab- 
lishment of Italian independence in 1859, 
the Turkish revolution of 1907 and the Rus- 
sian revolution of 1917 are landmarks in 
this onward sweep of popular government. 
Germany started, indeed, bravely and nobly 
on her own struggle for independence early 
in the nineteenth century, when, largely 
through the enthusiasm of the students at 
her universities, the popular uprising took 

76 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

place which succeeded in freeing Germany 
from the Napoleonic yoke. It is significant 
that the ruler of Germany at the time, Fred- 
erick William III, and his advisers were 
lukewarm towards the movement, for as rep- 
resentatives of the old system they instinc- 
tively realized that the liberation of Ger- 
many by the people might lead to the further 
attempt to liberate Germany also from the 
yoke of autocratic rule. Accordingly, after 
the Napoleonic wars were over, the states- 
men and military leaders of Germany de- 
vised the present military system which 
brought the army under complete subjec- 
tion to the government, to be used by that 
government for the perpetuation of the old 
system of government over the people. 

It is a sad outcome indeed of a struggle 
for independence that the people themselves 
should have forged the chains that bound 
them to the will of an autocratic ruler, so 
that when the year 1848 came around the 
masses snapped at the chains but could not 
break them. Some steps, to be sure, were 
77 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

taken towards the democratization of the 
government. Constitutions were grudg- 
ingly granted, which accorded a certain 
measure of popular control, but the basic 
principle of autocracy was unchanged. 
With the army under their complete control, 
the rulers of the German States could adapt 
themselves to the new order without forfeit- 
ing the essence of their authority. This was 
notably the case in Prussia, the largest and 
most powerful of the German States, which 
gradually secured and maintained a su- 
premacy over the others. The union of the 
German States after the war with France 
into the present German Empire has fur- 
ther increased the domination of Prussia, 
and this despite sporadic symptoms of oppo- 
sition, particularly on the part of the states 
of South Germany. 

The government took advantage of the 
strong national patriotism of the Germans, 
kept alive through the memory of the older 
struggle for independence, and intensified 
by the enthusiasm created through the estab- 

78 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

lishment of a powerful united German 
Empire, to further secure its hold over the 
people. It did so in a clever, and, on the 
surface at least, beneficent manner. It 
sought to smother rising discontent by pro- 
viding in most efficient fashion for the needs 
of the masses. It introduced legislation for 
the protection of labor laws, which aimed 
to safeguard the health of workingmen and 
to secure them against the tyranny of 
capital ; and it promoted and encouraged in- 
dustrial and commercial expansion through- 
out the country. But at the same time the 
government in an equally systematic and 
efficient fashion built up the most powerful 
military machine that the world has ever 
seen, and which has served a double purpose : 
to keep the people under complete control, 
and to create precisely the power which a 
military system regards as its main support 
in carrying out national ambitions. The 
German military system sets its face reso- 
lutely against the abandonment of the old 

principle of autocracy, which assumes that 
79 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

government is vested by divine providence 
in the hands of the ruler. The military gov- 
ernment of Germany is a restraining force, 
granting the minimum of self-government 
to the people, making concessions only to 
popular movements for democracy when 
forced by circumstances to do so, and deter- 
mined not to let go its grasp on the people. 
It seeks the perpetuation of its power over 
the people. The German government rested 
as strongly in 1914 as in 1848 on the prin- 
ciple that government was to be over the 
people, not by the people ; and so, as a logi- 
cal consequence, all national policies are not 
only in the hands of the government, but are 
guided by the small group which the rulers 
of the people of Germany call to their aid, 
and who are responsible to the head of the 
government, and not to the people. The 
government rules the people by the help of 
the army. Therein lies the crux of the situa- 
tion. In all other countries of Europe the 
army forms the body of defense for the coun- 
try ; in Germany the army is the ally of the 

80 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

government — its right hand — without which 
it would be powerless to enforce its will. 

The combination of the government with 
the army necessarily leads to the enthrone- 
ment of the militaristic spirit. An army is 
a symbol of power, of sheer material 
strength, and the government that employs 
the army as the agency of maintaining its 
hold over the people creates the moral issue 
involved in the war, and which we may now 
more specifically define as the determination 
to divorce national policies from power as 
the means of carrying them out. 

VII 

A further natural and disastrous result 
of a background of militarism to the national 
policy of a people — and one that is likewise 
closely bound up in the moral issue of the 
war — is the creation of a theory of state- 
craft to fit in with existing conditions. That 
theory further clarifies the moral issue. The 
theorist is not infrequently the man who is 
led to justify the status quo by showing that 
it is in accord with logic. Your theorist did 

6 81 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

not fail to put in an appearance in Germany. 
Philosophers, historians, theologians, econo- 
mists and natural scientists, in concert, sup- 
plied the framework for the ideal of the 
State as the highest expression of the na- 
tional unit. The aim of the State was 
predicated as the acquirement of power. It 
has been customary since the outbreak of the 
war to associate the spread of this theory in 
Germany with the influence exerted by 
Treitschke, the Prussian historian, and to 
regard Nietzsche as the exponent of the 
system on its philosophical side, and Bern- 
hardi as the one who illustrates it from the 
military point of view. Treitschke, how- 
ever, is merely an exponent of a theory of 
government already in full force when he 
leaped into fame. He is not in any sense the 
originator of a theory of statecraft. He sets 
the stamp of approval upon a system that 
had been evolved by the military rulers 
since the early decades of the nineteenth cen- 
tury, and tries to justify it by providing a 
theory that will fit in with the facts. For 

82 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

many of his views, emphasizing a militaristic 
background as essential to a powerful state, 
he harks back to a far greater, though also 
more cruel thinker, Clausewitz, the military 
writer whose elaborate work on " War," 9 
in part philosophical, in part strategical, 
was of fundamental importance in the devel- 
opment of a system of military government 
in Prussia, and, later on, throughout all Ger- 
many. Treitschke's influence was profound 
during his lifetime because he interpreted 
the spirit that set in in Germany after 1870, 
with its insistence upon the superiority of 
everything Teutonic as the basis of the 
strength of the people. It was that over- 
emphasis on nationalism, interpreted in 
terms of victory, achieved in the three wars 
of 1864, 1866 and 1870, which spelt power 
as the ally of the State and which led to the 

9 Not published Mil 1832, the year after Clause- 
witz's death. The last edition of the English trans- 
lation in three volumes, by J. J. Graham, with an 
introduction by Colonel Maude, appeared in 1911 
(London). 

83 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

theory of the State as the highest expression 
of power. 

Similarly, the philosophy of Nietzsche 
in some of its aspects (but not in all) fitted 
in with the actual conditions that prevailed 
after the '80's in Germany, but it is erro- 
neous to suppose that the militaristic spirit 
was guided by a thinker who was neglected 
until a few years before his death, and whose 
influence became a factor in the national 
life only after the nation had been thor- 
oughly drilled through the system itself. 10 
It was said of a certain philosopher that he 

10 Our Ex-Ambassador to Germany, James W. 
Gerard, in his new book, " Face to Face with Kaiser- 
ism," has some suggestive remarks on this subject 
confirming the view here taken, and showing how 
absurd it is to assume that the military chiefs of 
Germany sat up nights reading Nietzsche in order 
to steep themselves in his theories. Mr. Gerard also 
shows that a propagandist work, embodying the 
plans and methods of the German military party, by 
Otto Richard Tannenberg, Gross-Deutschland, was 
of far greater importance than the much quoted 
Bernhardi, whose writings are to be regarded as a 
symptom of existing conditions, rather than as having 
any great influence in bringing about those conditions. 
84 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

had been understood by only one of his dis- 
ciples, and that that one had misunderstood 
him. One wonders what Nietzsche, who had 
little sympathy for the trend of modern 
Germany, 11 would say if he were alive to 
witness the enthronement of his " Super- 
man," in the person of the present Emperor, 
as the highest symbol of the power of the 
State. What would he say of his superman, 
who overcomes power, pictured as the em- 
bodiment of power? But the Nietzschean 
philosophy, it must be admitted, can be in- 
terpreted as the prophecy of a triumphant 
military system, founded on the theory of 
the sovereignty of the State, and indepen- 
dent of the desires of those who form the 
State. It has been so read in order to pro- 
vide a theory that will fit in with the facts, 
not to explain, but to justify existing condi- 
tions. The pamphleteers of Pan-German- 

11 While preparing his work on " The Will to 
Power," he expressed the wish that it might be writ- 
ten in French, so as not to appear to give counte- 
nance to German imperial aspirations. (Salter, 
" Nietzsche, The Thinker," p. 357.) 
85 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

ism followed along the same lines of glori- 
fying the growth of Germany's power by 
providing a theoretical substratum of an 
economic character. 12 Historians, theolo- 
gians, and scientists joined to swell the 
chorus, particularly since the outbreak of 
the war, all caught by the temptation to 
justify the things that are, by endorsing the 
theory of the State that crushes the expres- 
sion of the popular will. 13 It is indeed de- 
pressing to see the galaxy of university 
teachers and the exponents of religion in the 
pulpit unite to glorify the mailed fist of an 

12 See, for example, the work of S. Grumbach, 
" Germany's Annexation Aims," which is a most re- 
markable collection of documents and statements that 
have appeared in Germany since the 4th of August, 
1914, from government officials, statesmen, his- 
torians, economists, etc. (Translated by E. Barker, 
New York, 1917.) 

13 See the collection of utterances of men of learn- 
ing, as well as others, in the volume entitled " Out 
of Their Own Mouths" (New York, 1917). The 
collection is all the more noteworthy because the 
compiler, in a fair spirit, adds also in the concluding 
chapter, protests on the part of Germans against 
the ambitions and methods of the present government. 

86 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

ambitious and restless ruler, who represents 
in his person a mediseval conception of su- 
preme authority confirmed by divine sanc- 
tion, der Allerhoechste! — a title higher than 
that given to the Almighty Himself. 

The highest aim of the State is thus predi- 
cated as the acquirement of power. We 
must beware, indeed, of making the error 
of assuming that this theory, though per- 
nicious in its ultimate analysis, is entirely 
without warrant. There are phases of this 
aspect of the State which we can well afford 
to consider in reaching a worthier concep- 
tion. The State has a right to make de- 
mands of its citizens in the common interest, 
and even to ask them to endure sacrifices. 
But the theory becomes insidious when it is 
used as a weapon in the hands of a group 
for the purpose of developing power in two 
directions, as the means on the one hand of 
controlling a people, and, on the other hand, 
as a means of carrying out national policies. 
Patriotism does not spell blind obedience to 
the aims of the State as defined by a group 

87 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

seeking self-perpetuation as its own end. 
The deeper patriotism, resting on the popu- 
lar will, seeks to direct the aims of the State 
into the right direction. In a government 
that is carried on by the sovereign will of the 
people, the ideals and aspirations of the 
people are, under normal conditions, carried 
out by virtue of their inherent force, and not 
by the appeal to force or by the threat of a 
military machine. 

It is not accidental that biology was ap- 
pealed to in further support both of the 
theory that power was the proper goal of 
the nation, and of war as the logical means 
of carrying out the policies of a nation. 
The biological argument for war — that it 
corresponds to a law of nature to which man- 
kind as part of creation is subject — can be 
used with potent effect for upholding a mili- 
tary system; and it has been so used by 
writers in Germany and elsewhere, whose 
frankness and boldness constitute the only 
redeeming feature of the horrible picture of 
incessant strife that these writers unfold as 

88 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

the natural destiny of mankind. The bio- 
logical argument for war, as also the theory 
that the goal of the State is to acquire power, 
ignores the inherent contrast between the 
natural drift of things and the conscious di- 
rection of civilization, which is revolt against 
natural law. Power and civilization are not 
allies, but hostile rivals. They represent the 
opposition between Ahriman and Ahura- 
mazda. Civilization means the gradual 
elimination of mere brute force as the 
weapon to carry out man's destiny. Civi- 
lization brings to the front factors, such as 
consideration for the physically weak, the 
elements of love and pity, that are incom- 
patible with the domination of mere power. 
We owe to Heine what is perhaps the most 
vivid picture of what happens to a civiliza- 
tion when it neglects the recognition of the 
factors that represent the triumph over 
power, and when ruthless power is placed 
at the service of civilization. At the close 
of his brilliant and still valuable treatise on 

89 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

" Religion and Philosophy in Germany," 14 
Heine, writing at a time when the creation 
of a strong military system in Germany had 
already begun to color the trend of philo- 
sophical thought and to uncover the dangers 
inherent in such a system, reveals with al- 
most prophetic insight a glimpse of the time 
when the theories of the philosophers, 15 used 

14 Written originally for the Revue des Deux 
Mondes. The passage, here quoted, is significantly 
used as the motto for a series of French documents 
illustrative of the war, and published by a French 
Catholic organization. 

15 As a supplement to Heine, one should read 
John Dewey's brilliant and penetrating " German 
Philosophy and Politics " (New York, 1915), which 
illustrates the manner in which the systems of 
thought produced by patriotic idealists issue into 
a glorification of unbridled power to carry out the 
aims of the State, even at the cost of morality and 
of the enslavement of the people. In this way it 
happens that even Kant's " Categorical Imperative " 
can be appealed to by the Emperor in support of 
his position, though Kant assuredly meant something 
different by his impressive thought that the call to 
duty without ulterior divine sanction is the highest 
expression of man's capacity to work out his ultimate 
destiny. 

90 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

to support the aims of the State as the em- 
bodiment of power, will be transformed into 
action, with the result of bringing into play 
the demoniac powers of the old Germanic 
gods, when forces will be loosened that will 
sweep with blind fury over the world. He 
sees the old gods of the Teutons rising up, 
" rubbing the dust of a thousand years out 
of their eyes, led by Thor, leaping forth 
with his mighty hammer to shatter Gothic 
cathedrals." The savagery of war, Heine 
predicts, will be unfurled in all the titanic 
rage, of which the old Norse poets sang. 
One fancies as one reads these predictions 
that Heine is speaking directly to us — and 
it is also significant that for Heine this day 
of wrath, which he sees coming, is the pre- 
cursor to the final struggle in Germany for 
the liberation from the military and auto- 
cratic yoke. In this respect, too, he may 
turn out to be guided by prophetic instinct. 
But for us the chief interest in the picture 
that he draws is the help that it affords in 
understanding the transformation that Ger- 

91 



THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE 

many has undergone under the influence of 
the creation of a military system of mon- 
strous proportions, made attractive to the 
people through its justification by intel- 
lectual leaders, providing the theory to sub- 
stantiate the facts. 

The combination of the factors that I 
have thus tried to indicate has brought about 
the present situation in which the civilized 
world has been forced to unite for the pro- 
tection of humanity. The moral issue can- 
not be won until the liberal elements in Ger- 
many, which are engaged in the same strug- 
gle, shall have acquired the power to sweep 
the pernicious system out of existence, or 
until by a decisive defeat the present ruling 
forces in Germany shall meet their merited 
doom. There is no half-way victory in the 
case of a moral issue. It must be carried on 
to a complete triumph. The rattling of the 
sabre is the voice of Ahriman, the power that 
makes for evil. It sounds as a challenge to 
all mankind to come to the rescue. 

92 



PART II 

THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

" Above all Nations is Humanity." 

Goldwin Smith. 

I 

It is from the point of view suggested by 
the moral issue that we should approach the 
problem of peace, to which, even during the 
conflict, our thoughts should be directed. 
Not, indeed, in the sense of detailing what 
the terms of peace are to be, but to clarify 
our minds as to what we mean by peace, 
and the kind of peace to which we may look 
forward. So far as terms of peace are con- 
cerned, it is presumptuous, as well as un- 
wise, for the ordinary individual to discuss 
them — especially at the present juncture. 
The problems involved in peace terms are 
so intricate that they can be grasped only 
by those whose entire attention is directed 
towards statecraft. There are scarcely more 
than a dozen individuals in the world whose 

95 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

opinions on the terms of peace would have 
the slightest value. This phase of the sub- 
ject must be left to those who can speak in 
official language. But the general ques- 
tion of the kind of peace that the world 
needs, comes well within the scope of a dis- 
cussion that forms a natural corollary to a 
consideration of the moral issue involved in 
the war. Moreover, the discussion of the 
general problem of peace is essential in the 
midst of the conflict for the purpose of 
creating an intelligent public opinion that 
will be prepared to assert itself when the 
time for peace negotiations arrives. A war 
like the present demands that upon the 
triumph of the moral issue involved, those 
who will be called upon to act for the nations 
now shedding their blood in such profusion 
and who in diverse ways are enduring a 
martyrdom for a sacred cause, 1 will be 

1 "A liberal civilization ascending its Calvary" — 
as Mr. James M. Beck, in a recent address (" The 
Peril of Premature Peace Parleys/' p. 18), vividly 
puts the tragic situation. 

96 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

guided by public opinion and not merely by 
the dictates of their own individual judg- 
ment. It is essential that the terms of 
peace reflect that opinion. There is per- 
haps little danger of these terms being 
drawn up in the interest of any particular 
class, but there is always a danger at the 
close of a war, on the part of those sitting 
round the conference table, of overlooking 
the main issue, through the failure of the 
crystallization of public opinion in regard 
to that issue. The fundamental objection 
to what goes under the name ofa" German 
Peace " is that all proposals emanating up 
to the present, directly or indirectly, from 
the German government ignore the moral 
issue. There is not the slightest attempt 
made even to recognize its existence, much 
less to meet it. The German government 
has not as yet given the slightest hint of 
being conscious of the crime committed 
against civilization by the ravaging of Bel- 
gium, which had no share in the immediate 

7 97 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

causes that led to the war. If it be true that 
the German people, at present carried away 
by the glamor of temporary supremacy over 
a demoralized Russia, are behind the gov- 
ernment in its present unrepentant mood, 
it is merely an indication that the struggle 
for the moral issue must continue until it is 
recognized by the German people as an ob- 
stacle to peace that can be removed in only 
one way. But we, too, must be on our 
guard lest those acting for us should not 
fully realize that the moral issue also de- 
mands that never again shall it be left in 
the hands of a few, in any country, to bring 
on a war or to dictate the terms of peace. 
Peoples who pay the price of war must con- 
trol the spirit hovering over peace negotia- 
tions. They can do so only by giving voice 
to their hopes and aspirations in so emphatic 
a manner that it will be heeded by their 
representatives. If through the crystalliza- 
tion of public opinion the resolves of the 
peoples in all belligerent lands shall swell 

98 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

into a mighty chorus in the demand for a 
just peace, and, so far as it lies within human 
possibility, for a permanent peace, we may 
feel reasonably certain that such a peace, 
and none other, will be forthcoming. The 
details can then be safely left, as indeed 
they must be left, to the experienced states- 
men who will be chosen to act for the people. 
It is in the hope of making a modest contri- 
bution towards the clarification of public 
opinion and of stimulating others who have 
studied the situation to do the same, that I 
venture on a general discussion of the prob- 
lem of peace from the point of view of the 
moral issue involved in the war. 

II 

First, then, what do we mean by peace? 
Surely more than a temporary and patch- 
work settlement of the issues between the 
European nations that existed at the out- 
break of the war, and which led to the strug- 
gle that appeared to be at first merely a con- 

99 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

flict for supremacy among rival contestants. 
Peace congresses have hitherto been founded 
on the principle of trying to patch up an 
agreement between contending nations, in- 
stead of probing for the causes of a war, and 
of regulating the relations between nations 
according to ascertained principles. A 
peace congress after a war has generally 
meant merely a shuffling of cards with a re- 
distribution in such a manner that one or 
two of the nations are given the trumps, and 
the rest have to be content with what they 
get. One is tempted to say that one reason 
why there have been so many wars in the 
nineteenth century is because there have 
been so many peace congresses. There were 
three notable ones, besides many minor con- 
ferences — Vienna in 1815, Paris in 1856, 
and Berlin in 1878. Each one of these con- 
gresses settled European affairs so clumsily 
as to lead to the preparation for the next 
war. Immanuel Kant, in a noble and 
notable essay setting forth some ideas on 

100 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

perpetual peace, points out that a peace 
treaty should never contain the seeds of an- 
other war. Peace treaties hitherto have al- 
ways contained such seeds. Because of this 
fact, peace congresses have in the past not 
established peace, but merely an armistice, 
of shorter or longer duration. The first 
step in the direction of real peace in our 
days was taken in 1889, when the Hague 
conference was convened. That was a gen- 
uine peace congress, as was also its suc- 
cessor in 1907, for these conferences devoted 
themselves to the consideration of the causes 
that produce wars. The first duty of a 
peace congress is to consider war, not peace 
— to interpret the deeper meaning of a war 
that has broken out, to consider the condi- 
tions that make for war, and to ascertain 
the principles that should guide nations in 
the settlement of a war after the fighting is 
over. Such were the functions that the two 
Hague Conferences took upon themselves. 

The circumstance that these conferences 
101 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

were unable to prevent the war of 1914 does 
not spell failure, but merely an indication 
that the nations of the world were not yet 
prepared for peace. The great powers rep- 
resented in these conferences were at the 
time filled with thoughts of war, and some 
of them with preparations for war, and 
under the influence of the historical tradi- 
tion that dominated European politics to 
the outbreak of the war in 1914, war, active 
or in embryo, was a normal condition — peace 
the abnormal. How could it be otherwise, 
with wars following in the wake of one an- 
other in constant and rapid succession. 
There is scarcely a period of five years in 
the nineteenth century in which we do not 
find war somewhere in Europe, or in Asia, 
or in Africa, or in this country. As long 
as nations think first of war and only in a 
secondary degree of peace, as long as na- 
tions are prepared or preparing for war — 
and that may be necessary even after this 
war — how is it possible for peace to prevail ? 

102 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

Let us face the question frankly, for next 
to an inconclusive peace, the worst evil that 
can befall us is to have a muddled idea of 
peace. By peace, therefore, we should mean 
the establishment of conditions that make 
for peace. The Hague Conferences took 
an important step in this direction by the 
assertion of the principle of tribunals of 
arbitration for the settlement of difficulties 
between nations. If these conferences had 
done nothing more they would have amply 
justified their existence, for this step marks 
a beginning of the determination of the con- 
ditions under which peace is possible. Such 
tribunals had been convened from time to 
time before The Hague conferences, but 
the principle had not hitherto been accepted 
as an integral part of modern international 
politics. The second conference also pro- 
posed to discuss the question of disarma- 
ment, but the opposition of Germany pre- 
vented this desirable aim from being carried 
out. At the Third Conference, it is safe to 

103 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

predict, the question of disarmament will be 
the primary one — as it is equally safe to 
prophesy that, assuming the triumph of the 
moral issue involved in the war, no nation 
will dare to oppose a discussion of so funda- 
mental a problem, least of all Germany, 
which, chastened by her present moral iso- 
lation — which must be stinging to the pride 
of a nation — will realize, perhaps more 
clearly than any other, that her own salva- 
tion and future progress will depend upon 
the removal of the most serious obstacle to 
peace, the existence of a large and powerful 
military machine, so burdensome to a people 
and fraught with such danger because the 
machine is a symbol of power and of noth- 
ing else. To be sure, with a democratic form 
of government established in all countries, 
resting upon the principle of government 
through the will of the people, the danger 
of militarism arising from the existence of 
large armies will be diminished. Yet it is 
conceivable that even free countries may be 

104 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

tempted by false leaders towards calling in 
power as an aid to carrying out national 
policies. Even republics are not free from 
this danger, for the lure of conquest may be 
dangled in a most attractive form before the 
eyes of a people. Power creates the tempta- 
tion to use power. The existence of a large 
military class in a population tends to keep 
alive the spirit of war, and the spirit of war 
is only a few degrees removed from the mili- 
taristic spirit. A plan of disarmament, care- 
fully worked out and carried out gradually, 
is therefore a logical step towards the estab- 
lishment of a genuine peace. Disarmament 
is the corollary to the recognition of the prin- 
ciple of tribunals of arbitration. 

A third fundamental principle for the 
establishment of a genuine peace involves 
the organization of some kind of a league of 
nations which will have the authority also 
to carry out its decrees for safeguarding the 
world against a mad outbreak on the part of 
any single nation, or of a combination of 

105 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

nations attempting to act independently of 
the proposed league. Opinions are nat- 
urally divided, and considerably so, as to 
the form which such a league shall take. 
Many strong voices have been raised in 
favor of an international parliament (under 
whatever name), to meet regularly and to 
which representatives should be elected 
either proportionate to the population of 
nations, or in equal numbers from all the 
nations represented. Such an international 
body, representative of public opinion, and 
not the kind of opinion which emanates from 
diplomatic groups, could devote itself to 
the consideration of international problems 
as they arise, to the regulation of interna- 
tional commerce ; to the safeguarding of the 
interests of weaker nations against en- 
croachments of powerful groups ; to remov- 
ing causes of irritation to any nation, and 
to forestalling, so far as humanly possible, 
crises that may lead to war. Such a body 
would also take over the important func- 

106 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

tions of the Hague conferences in regulat- 
ing the methods of warfare for the protec- 
tion of neutrals and noncombatants, and for 
keeping a conflict which might arise within 
such limits as to prevent the danger of the 
collapse of civilization, so seriously threat- 
ened by the present war. 

With power to carry out its regulations, 
such a parliament would obviously be a body 
primarily devoted to studying the causes 
of war. Its functions will necessarily lead 
to such a study. It will be able, by virtue 
of accumulating experience, shared in by 
all the nations represented, to detect dan- 
gers in time to prevent their growing beyond 
control. 

Above all, an international representative 
body will be a powerful incentive in pro- 
moting the spirit of internationalism, in 
order to counteract the overemphasis on 
nationalism which we have seen to have been 
one of the causes that has led to the moral 
downfall of so many of the intellectual 

107 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

leaders of Germany during the present war. 
For one of the most discouraging signs of 
the present outlook is the frank opposition 
among German intellectuals to anything 
that smacks of internationalism. Ex- Am- 
bassador David Jayne Hill, in his valuable 
work on the " Rebuilding of Europe," 
touches upon this point in connection with 
a quotation from the leading historian of 
Germany, 2 who goes so far as to advocate 
the abandonment of all international en- 
deavors as an idle pursuit, a political will- 
o'-the-wisp; and why? Because Germany, 
he says, is always the loser in such efforts, 
obliged, as she is, to yield something to the 
interests of the other nations. The distin- 
guished professor does not seem to be aware 
that he thus involuntarily reveals the in- 
herent defect in Germany's national policy 
by the admission that it is incompatible with 
international considerations. How can a 
nation shape its policy on an assumption 

2 Page 138. 

108 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

that it represents an isolated unit — more 
particularly in these days of international 
commingling of interests? That point of 
view, with its exaggerated emphasis on na- 
tionalism, arises logically in a country which 
depends, not upon the inherent qualities of 
its policy, but upon military power or the 
threat of force to carry out its ends. A 
nation that is under the delusion that it is 
proper to ignore international points of view 
will naturally be led to ride roughshod over 
the interests of other countries. Such a 
nation commits the cardinal sin which will 
rebound on the head of the one who is guilty 
of it. Brandes, in the prophetic passage 
which I have chosen as the motto of this 
essay, properly holds up as the contrast to 
the international spirit prevalent in the 
rest of the world, the position of Germany 
as a center of conservatism in a progressive 
Europe. The manifestation of the inter- 
national spirit in science, in art, in labor 
unions, in business organizations, in human- 

109 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

itarian endeavors, is one of the striking 
symptoms of the age in which we live. The 
spread of this spirit may well be regarded 
as the hope of the future. Internationalism 
will form the very basis of progress in the 
new world which will arise out of the crisis 
through which we are now passing. An in- 
ternational body, whether a league or parlia- 
ment of nations, thus looms up as a further 
logical expression to be given to the com- 
plete triumph of the moral issue. 

Ill 

As against this larger scheme of a parlia- 
ment or international body, sitting at regu- 
lar periods, a more restricted scheme of a 
league of nations, primarily and chiefly to 
enforce peace, commends itself to many wise 
minds as more in keeping with the present 
still undeveloped stage reached in the mani- 
festation of the international spirit. It is 
held that we have not yet advanced to the 
point when nations will be willing to sink 
no 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

their national interests to the extent that 
would be required by the establishment of 
a genuine and effective international parlia- 
ment. The blending of interests, it is 
argued, may lead, at the present juncture 
of affairs, to the weakening of some nations 
and redound to the unequal advantage of 
others. So distinguished an authority as 
Dr. Hill, whose important investigations 
in the history of diplomacy, supplemented 
by his large practical experience, give to 
his utterances special weight, is among those 
who question the advisability of planning at 
present for an international body with legis- 
lative functions and powers. Between the 
difficulties involved in voluntary adhesion 
to the decrees of such a body on the one 
hand, and compulsory acceptance on the 
other, an international parliament would 
find it difficult to steer a course that could 
lead to positive results. It is urged that 
such a parliament might be inclined to en- 
croach on the internal affairs of a country, 
ill 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

or on what a country would regard as such, 
and at the present stage of sharp differen- 
tiation between nationalistic characteristics, 
involving opposite ways of looking at inter- 
national problems, the most that could be 
hoped for would be the creation of a nucleus 
" for the ultimate union of all responsi- 
ble and socially inclined nations." 3 

There is much force in such contentions, 
which have been advanced in various forms 
by others; but the objection need not carry 
us further than to suggest that the scope 
of an international parliament must needs 
be at first restricted to a consideration of the 
most necessary measures needed to establish 
a genuine peace. The objection, on the other 
hand, against a mere league of nations to 
enforce peace is obviously this — that it 
places too exclusive a regard upon the com- 
bination of the nations of the world against 
a disturber of the world's tranquillity as the 

3 " Rebuilding of Europe," page 187. 
112 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

one means of securing peace. That view 
naturally comes to our minds through the 
act of Germany in bringing on the war, when 
she might have prevented it by accepting 
Sir Edward Grey's proposal for a confer- 
ence at the time of the Austro- Serbian 
crisis. But must it be assumed that this 
condition will necessarily be the greatest 
source of danger in the future? If I am 
correct in the analysis of the war as in- 
volving primarily a moral issue, does not this 
issue rather point to an entirely different 
source of danger, to wit, the use of power 
to carry out national aims? If this be so, 
the avoidance of the danger for the future 
should go to the root of the evil — the con- 
trol of an entire people by a military group. 
If the war ends, as we feel that it must end, 
by the triumph of the moral issue, the mental 
frame of the world will not be such as to 
suggest that the primary end of an inter- 
national league is the protection against a 
possible criminal among the nations, but 

8 113 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

rather to the furtherance of international 
relations as the greatest safeguard against 
the creation of such a criminal. 

If the war, however, should close without 
the overthrow of militarism in Germany, 
then, to be sure, a league of nations, formed 
to enforce peace, will be the logical step. 
In such a league an unrepentant and un- 
chastened Germany would have no place, 
for the world would still be in danger of an 
alliance between Germany and some other 
power or powers, bent on imperialistic 
ambitions of domination and conquest. A 
league to enforce peace may well be needed 
at the close of the war, but it is not the kind 
of an international body to which we should 
look forward as an ideal. Such a league 
may represent an intermediate measure de- 
manded by conditions that may exist on the 
termination of the conflict; but the efforts 
of the world ought to be directed towards 
a combination of nations which does not rest 
upon suspicion, but which assumes as its 

114 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

basis the desire of nations to determine the 
principles upon which the peace of the world 
can be erected. 

IV 

More serious are the objections of those 
who in a spirit of discouragement, which is 
not unnatural in the light of the present de- 
pressing experience, feel that international 
guarantees and decisions are of no value 
unless backed by the force to carry them 
out. The conclusion is drawn from the un- 
holy alliance in Germany between power 
and national policies, that the only safe- 
guard of the world is to oppose power by 
power. Ambitious nations or even nations 
without sinister designs of conquest, but 
which feel themselves hemmed in, or which 
scent the hostility of sister nations against 
their national expansion, will not be re- 
strained by treaties or agreements, entered 
into by a former generation, which, it will 
be claimed, did not foresee the developments 

115 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

of the future. Nations will wish to set aside 
agreements when such agreements are irk- 
some. If relief cannot be found through 
channels of amicable diplomacy, the en- 
deavor will be made to obtain it at the point 
of the sword. The world, it is held, must be 
prepared to meet such crises which may at 
any moment arise, by the threat of larger 
power against an aggressive or unconscien- 
tious member of the society of nations. This 
means that all nations, and especially the 
stronger ones, must be ready, through large 
standing armies, to assert their rights and 
the rights of weaker nations against unjust 
demands. Nations, it is held, are after all 
aggregates of power. The idealist may 
picture them otherwise, but the facts are 
against him. The league to enforce peace 
is of no value unless it is in a military sense 
strong enough to frighten the strongest pos- 
sible offender into submission. Even such 
submission may not hinder the offender from 
making another attempt at a more favorable 

116 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

moment, or when he thinks himself strong 
enough to take the gambler's chance against 
the whole field. 

Now the answer to the contentions of the 
realist is assuredly not to paint in glowing 
colors a Utopian picture of a purely imag- 
inary millennium, even though the idealist 
might reply that many a dream, at one time 
considered purely fanciful, has been realized, 
even within the domain of international poli- 
tics. Unless indeed we accept the biological 
argument for war, and further maintain in 
a frank, though pessimistic, spirit that war 
is man's natural element, and regard wars 
between nations as the means by which, 
under the wastefulness of nature, the desti- 
nies of peoples are worked out and progress, 
so far as one can speak of progress, is at- 
tained — unless we take this position, there 
is no more inherent reason why war should 
not be stamped out than why poverty should 
not be stamped out, or why eventually all 
contagious diseases should not be conquered 

117 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

by the growth of medical science. The stu- 
dent who looks to the future does not delude 
himself by the idle fancy that if war is abol- 
ished the millennium will have been attained. 
The Golden Age will still be far off, for 
war is only one of many evils, and perhaps 
not the worst. The objection to the biolog- 
ical argument has already been set forth, 
that it ignores the inherent opposition be- 
tween civilization and the display of power 
which is Nature's way. The aim of civiliza- 
tion is that of the " Superman," to overcome 
power by the introduction of other factors 
in the evolution of man that are distinct 
from power — factors that make for the 
triumph over power. If we accept this 
premise, the only ground for an attitude of 
despair regarding efforts at establishing a 
genuine peace as hopeless, would be to 
assume that the causes of war cannot be re- 
moved, and this is obviously gratuitous. 

In the present instance, always assuming 
that my analysis of the situation is correct, 

118 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

the cause is to be found in the combination 
of power with national ambitions. That 
cause, we have seen, was also active at vari- 
ous crises in the history of the world, when 
the world found it necessary to unite in re- 
moving a menace presented by some imper- 
ialistic nation or group. It has also been 
shown that the source of greatest danger lies 
in the concentration of power within a group 
holding an entire nation in control, and that 
the danger is far less when power is con- 
ferred on a group by the freely expressed 
will of the people. The moral issue in the 
present war arises from the circumstance 
that the power in Germany is wielded by a 
group that does not receive its mandate from 
the people, but which has inherited its posi- 
tion from an autocratic form of government, 
that has never been abolished but only modi- 
fied to some degree under pressure exerted 
by growing popular opposition to it. Con- 
cessions have been wrung from autocracy, 
but the principle of autocracy has been 

119 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

maintained, though there are signs of its tot- 
tering. The moral issue which involves as 
the condition of its triumph the disruption 
of the alliance between national policies and 
military power also points, as a necessary 
condition before peace can be established on 
the basis of the principles underlying peace, 
to the overthrow of the present system of 
government of Germany, which shapes pub- 
lic opinion in ways that are dark and devious, 
instead of being governed by the free ex- 
pression of the popular will. The system 
corrupts public opinion, spreads an insidious 
poison that affects the intellectual classes 
and converts them into advocates of the 
status quo, instead of exercising their proper 
function to point the way out of the status 
quo. The system creates reactionaries, for 
the reactionary is the one who refuses to look 
to the future, whose face is turned in the 
wrong direction. He becomes an advocate 
of the pernicious principle of regarding what 
is as right, merely because it is. Hence, to 

120 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

quote Brandes again, Germany logically be- 
comes the center of conservatism in a pro- 
gressive Europe. 

Elsewhere 4 I have enlarged upon the 
necessity of all nations being organized on 
the same general basis of popular govern- 
ment, which does not mean a similarity of 
methods of government, but government on 
the fundamental principle that the authority 
of government rests with the people, and 
that government is an expression of the will 
of the people. That is what Kant, in his 
still valuable essay on " Perpetual Peace," 5 
defines as the democratic " form " of gov- 
ernment, towards which he felt after the 
French Revolution that the world was mov- 
ing. The moral issue in the present con- 
flict, we have seen, arises directly out of the 

4 See " The War and the Bagdad Railway," page 
137 et seq. 

5 Republished since the outbreak of the war, in con- 
venient form, both in England (London, 1915) and 
by the American Peace Society in this country. 

121 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

form or system of government in Germany, 
which is precisely the opposite of democratic. 
Given an ambitious ruler, under a non-dem- 
ocratic form of government, abetted by a 
group which like their chief is concerned with 
retaining its control over the people, and 
you obtain, as a logical sequence, the com- 
bination of power with national policy — 
power as the means of carrying out these 
policies. There can be no safeguarding of 
peace under such conditions. Danger lurks 
in every change in the political kaleidoscope, 
a danger which is all the greater for being 
hidden, until it is too late to avert the catas- 
trophe. Political intrigues, secret diplo- 
macy, the spy system, insidious propaganda, 
all arise as a logical outgrowth of a govern- 
ment carried on under a non-democratic 
form. If among some European nations 
that have passed on to the democratic form, 
we still find some of the methods of the older 
period followed to a certain extent, it is 
due in part to the principle of survivals — 

122 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

and old countries cannot rapidly detach 
themselves from traditional associations — 
and in part to the necessity of European 
nations to counteract the sinister efforts of 
governments that still stand on the old non- 
democratic basis, and in which, therefore, 
the old methods are in full swing, constitute 
in fact the only methods, because they go 
hand in hand with an open or thinly disguised 
autocratic form of government. It is ob- 
vious that there can be no lasting peace if 
at the end of the war Germany still main- 
tains its present system. If by any chance 
the war should close with the military party 
still in control, and with the Reichstag still 
a mere debating society, as it has been called, 
without being recognized as a responsible 
source of the government, the war for the 
moral issue will have to go on, and assuredly 
will go on, even though a truce be declared. 
Without the triumph of the moral issue, it 
is inconceivable that a policy of disarma- 
ment can be inaugurated by any conference 

123 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

of nations. Large armies would have to 
be maintained in all countries. Tribunals 
of arbitration will be totally insufficient to 
prevent uprisings, and a league of nations 
will necessarily be limited to a league 
of defense against the danger of another 
attempt on the part of Germany to force 
her policies. 

We are thus ever brought back, in con- 
sidering the problem of peace, as in the dis- 
cussion of the war, to the moral issue. Hav- 
ing regard, therefore, to the establishment 
of conditions that may make for enduring 
peace, we may now set down as the primary 
one the necessity of the same general basis 
of a democratic form of government for all 
nations. Such a form is the only one con- 
sistent with the spirit of the age and with 
the stage of political development, reached 
in the course of a century and more after 
the principle of popular government was 
first proclaimed in definite terms by the 
American Declaration of Independence. 

124 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

If the German people are anxious for 
peace, as they are said to be, they have it in 
their hands to bring it about, by forcing the 
democratic issue in their own country. No 
enduring peace is possible with the present 
group in control of Germany, because no 
guarantees can be accepted from a govern- 
ment that has shown itself callous to agree- 
ments, and that gives no indication of any 
change of mind. The callousness and un- 
repentant frame of mind are the direct out- 
growth of that system under which the pres- 
ent government in Germany works. No 
change is, therefore, to be expected until 
the system is overthrown to make way for 
a government which is by the people and in 
control of the people. 

Once more, lest it be supposed that in lay- 
ing this persistent emphasis on the moral 
issue in the war I am being misled by a 
foolish dream that the millennium is to be 
ushered in through the universal establish- 
ment of the democratic principle in govern- 

125 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

ment, let me say that no such illusion is 
entertained by those who feel that without 
democracy a real peace is not possible. 
Militarism, as has already been suggested, 
may flourish in a democratic form of gov- 
ernment. Imperialism of an objectionable 
shade may arise as a menace in the most lib- 
eral of republics, but the danger is reduced 
to a minimum — and that is all that can be 
hoped for — when a people has the govern- 
ment of a country in its control, instead of 
being controlled by it. The reduction of the 
danger is as large a guarantee against the 
occurrence of an outbreak as is needed to 
form a basis upon which a genuine peace 
may be built up. The history of the past 
century in countries in which the democratic 
principle has been completely established 
shows that the militaristic spirit has actually 
diminished, and that imperialistic aims have 
been curbed so as to avoid the abuse of 
power. The verdict must be given that 
democracies have, on the whole, justified 

126 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

themselves by keeping national power within 
the bounds proper to the natural growth of 
a people. 

Here, then, we have some of the main 
foundations on which peace can be estab- 
lished — the organization of all nations on 
a democratic form of government as the 
primary condition, and then tribunals of 
arbitration, disarmament, and an assembly 
of nations in the form of a league or parlia- 
ment. Peace established on the recognition 
of such principles would be a genuine one, 
and not simply an armistice. The peace 
congress to be convened upon the termina- 
tion of the conflict which is guided by these 
principles will be reasonably safe from the 
danger of planting the seeds for future wars, 
which has been the fundamental weakness 
of the peace congresses of the past. Even 
a settlement of this kind will not necessarily 
prevent wars from breaking out, for new 
conditions may arise which cannot be fore- 
seen; but the danger is reduced to the pos- 

127 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

sible minimum, if the world is determined to 
direct its efforts primarily towards the re- 
moval of the causes that bring on a bloody 
conflict. 

With peace established on the application 
of the fundamental principles that underlie 
peace, the conference, which should be a 
popular body, consisting of representatives 
of all classes of the people, and not of diplo- 
mats representing governments, will be 
ready to take up the issues that confronted 
Europe at the outbreak of the war in 1914. 
To reach a settlement of problems, some of 
which represent a legacy of distant ages, will 
be a difficult task that will test the calibre of 
those who will have the privilege and re- 
sponsibility of acting for the peoples of the 
world. If the analysis attempted in this 
discussion to look both at the war and on 
the problems of peace from the point of view 
of the moral issue involved be accepted, the 
people's representatives will at least have a 
safe guide to follow in giving the first con- 

128 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

sideration, in the settlement of international 
problems, to the wishes and interests of 
the peoples directly involved. An enduring 
peace must be based on the rights of a peo- 
ple to determine its destiny, instead of hav- 
ing its liberties bandied about as was done 
by previous peace conferences, and which 
led to new difficulties and further conflicts. 

V 

As for autocracy, linked in the present 
moral issue to the spirit of militarism, that 
is doomed to disappear under all circum- 
stances, because entirely out of keeping with 
the spirit of the age. It has passed away in 
Russia since the beginning of the war. It 
remains as a mere shadow in Austria-Hun- 
gary, and has been shorn of much of its 
power even in Germany since the outbreak 
of the war. Genuine democracy, to be sure, 
has not yet made its appearance in Ger- 
many, and cannot so long as the military 
party is in control. The concessions that 

9 129 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

have been wrung from the military clique 
have not affected the theory upon which the 
German government rests, but they may be 
regarded as foreshadowing the weakening 
of that theory. The struggle between the 
Reichstag and the autocratic authority of 
the Crown, as represented before the war 
by the large body of Social Democrats, 
assumed a more threatening aspect in July 
of last year by the stand taken against the 
government by the Catholic Party; and 
though at present few signs of the conflict 
are to be seen on the surface, there is, never- 
theless, an undercurrent of opposition which 
will again come to the surface when the peo- 
ple realize that the world is in no mood to 
listen to peace proposals of a military group 
serving the interests of autocracy. The out- 
come of this phase of the struggle we must 
leave to developments within Germany, and 
wait as patiently as we can for the moment 
when the popular will will be strong enough 
to assert itself in such a way as to lead to 

130 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

the complete abandonment of the theory of 
autocracy. 

Much more serious will be the struggle 
for the overthrow of militarism, and mili- 
tarism is a greater danger than autocracy, 
for without the support of a military system 
autocracy cannot maintain itself. The at- 
tack on militarism, which during these try- 
ing three years and more has been going on 
steadily on the Western front, with the daily 
sacrifice of precious lives — the very flower 
of the nations — needs to be supplemented 
by attacks on the inside. It is being so sup- 
plemented, for despite the apparent unity, 
under the flush of temporary superiority 
over a disorganized foe, there are many indi- 
cations that the moral issue is understood 
by the liberal elements in Germany, who 
even at the present juncture are raising their 
warning signals. The struggle may be long, 
and it may need a damaging blow to the 
military prestige of Germany, before the 
conviction will be brought home to the Ger- 

131 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

man people that their country can extricate 
itself out of the position in which she has 
been placed by the alliance of power with 
the national ambitions, only through the 
creation of a new idea of the State as the 
collective will of the people. A new po- 
litical education of the people of Germany 
must come about as the result of this war. 
That new education will represent the 
triumph of the moral issue. A chastened 
Germany will mean a liberalized and democ- 
ratized Germany, free from the evils that 
flow from the present system. It is only 
such a Germany that will be able to resume 
her place in the concert of nations. The 
moral issue may be said to be approaching 
a crisis, symbolized on the one hand by the 
firm resolve of the civilized world to carry 
on the struggle to a triumphant issue, and 
on the other, by some signs of a sharpening 
of the issue in Germany itself. The war has 
already lasted beyond the time that would 
have been regarded as the limit of human 

132 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

endurance. Is it conceivable that an entire 
people should be so blinded for a much 
longer time by a false spirit of patriotism as 
to believe, on the one hand, that the welfare 
of their country is bound up with a sys- 
tem of government that is entirely beyond 
popular control, and, on the other hand, that 
this people should not see that in its last 
analysis the system is the source of the com- 
bination of the world against Germany, 
and the reason for the moral isolation in 
which Germany finds herself to-day and 
from which she will suffer for a long time 
after the war? 

The recent peace negotiations between 
Germany and Russia, revealing a most 
sinister policy of domination and conquest 
on a huge scale, are, to be sure, a depressing 
indication that there is not the slightest at- 
tempt on the part of the German govern- 
ment to realize the cardinal sin that has been 
committed by it against the moral con- 
science of mankind — which is a sin also 

133 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

against the spirit of history. For that gov- 
ernment is still steeped in the delusion that 
the peace of the world can be made by diplo- 
mats gathered around a table, with maps 
and pencils, to draw up new boundaries on 
the basis of victories on the field of battle. 
It is more than doubtful whether by such 
methods, in the present mental frame of the 
world, even a truce could be arranged, cer- 
tainly not the semblance of a peace such as 
the world needs and is longing for. The 
delusion that victories on the field of battle 
can be made the basis of settlement between 
nations, again arises directly out of the mili- 
taristic spirit. It is idle to hope, therefore, 
that as long as Germany continues in the 
grasp of a military system, the delusion will 
be dispelled. Annexations, conquests by 
force, domination, represent the logical 
corollary to the alliance between power and 
national policies, when wielded by a group 
that holds a nation in its tight grasp. We 
are thus, at every point, thrown back to the 

134 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

single issue involved in the struggle, whether 
we look at the situation from the point of 
view of the war, or from the point of view 
of the coming peace ; it is a fight against the 
appeal to power as a means of government 
over a people and as a means of carrying 
out national policies. The two aspects are 
the two sides of one and the same shield. 

The new order proclaims that a war is not 
settled either by victory or by defeat on the 
field of battle, but when the issue involved 
in the war has been won or lost. 

The question might be raised against the 
contention which forms both the starting 
point and the final goal of this study of the 
war and the problem of peace, that the 
emphasis on the moral issue as the point of 
view from which both war and peace are to 
be considered, is an over-emphasis; that 
while this issue may represent the reason 
why this country entered the war, and while 
its triumph may be regarded as the aim for 
which we are sacrificing lives on the field 

135 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

of battle, the nations of Europe are not 
ready to accept this point of view. Is not 
France, it may be asked, fighting, in the 
first place, to ward off an attack, and in the 
second, to regain, if successful, provinces 
taken from her forty years ago, and which 
she feels of right belong to her ? Is not Italy 
fighting to regain provinces which she feels 
are her own, and is not England fighting 
to retain her hold on possessions, as much as 
to carry out her obligations as one of the 
guarantors of Belgium's outraged neutral- 
ity? What, then, becomes of the moral 
issue? Let us see. France is fighting for 
her defense, but against what? Not against 
an enemy whom she has offended, but 
against one who is bent upon further weak- 
ening her, because France stands in the way 
of Germany's pursuit of her imperialistic 
aims. The hostility between the French 
and the Germans was gradually passing 
away during the decade before the war. 
Strong as the desire of France still was to 

136 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE ' 

regain provinces that had been wrested from 
her by the fortunes of war, it is generally 
recognized that she had no thought whatso- 
ever of precipitating a bloody conflict in 
order to realize her hopes. The attack upon 
her which came as a part of the policy of a 
government that had linked power with na- 
tional ambitions, places France in the atti- 
tude of fighting for that moral issue to the 
same extent that we are doing. As for Italy, 
while we may regret that on her entrance 
into the conflict she did not in a definite 
manner make the moral issue the basis for 
her participation, instead of presenting the 
spectacle of making a bargain — now estab- 
lished by the publication of the Secret 
Treaties 6 — it is nevertheless true that the 
recognition of the menace presented by Ger- 
many was the reason which led her to aban- 
don the Triple Alliance. Her leaders have 
given voice to this view, and it is to be hoped 

G See the symposium on " The Secret Treaties," in 
the Nation of February 7, 1918. 

137 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

that they will even more emphatically, as the 
conflict proceeds, set aside purely national 
aspirations and thus strengthen the forces of 
Italy in the world's struggle for liberty and 
right. England, finally, has, through the 
utterances of her leading statesmen, em- 
phasized again and again the singleness of 
the issue that represents the undercurrent in 
this war. If the expressions that reach us 
from the other side are not fully as definite 
as the message voiced on various occasions 
by President Wilson in statements that 
have already become historical, it must be 
remembered that the situation is much more 
complicated for Europe than it is for us. 
We are free from the entanglements of past 
European history. With nations elbowing 
one another, as is the case in Europe, gov- 
ernments that have received as a legacy from 
the past complicated issues resulting from 
the pernicious secret diplomacy that became 
a tradition in European Chancellories, find 
it more difficult to proclaim the new order 

138 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

of the world, even when that order is recog- 
nized by them; but just because of the con- 
ditions which the present Europe has in- 
herited from former generations, it is all the 
more important for us to distinguish be- 
tween surface indications and undercurrents. 
Our voice in stressing the moral issue as the 
one which sanctifies the war and takes it 
completely out of the category of being 
waged for the satisfaction of national ambi- 
tions, however much such ambitions may be 
justified from other points of view, is al- 
ready having a profound effect in clarifying 
the European situation. In fact, the uni- 
versality of the applause which has greeted 
these utterances is testimony to the extent 
to which the same opinions were already held 
in France and England, only a concrete 
statement of them being necessary to evoke 
immediate response. The proclamation of 
the new order by the President of this Re- 
public is rapidly becoming the most potent 
factor in leading to the complete acceptance 

139 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

of the moral issue as the one that unifies the 
civilized world in the present crisis. A broad 
view of the European situation, with due 
regard to conditions there that necessitate a 
slower pace, makes it evident that what is 
stirring England, France and Italy at the 
present moment to a determined resistance 
is the recognition of the issue which has 
brought us into the conflict. 

The civilized world proclaims in chorus 
to-day, as did Luther of old, " Here we 
stand ; we cannot do otherwise " — and will 
not. There is only one response pos- 
sible to such a cry, the triumph of the issue 
by the overthrow of the system which is the 
cause of the present calamitous condition of 
the world. Nor need we have any fear of 
the ultimate outcome if we but keep our 
eyes fixed on the one supreme issue. That 
condition is indeed of major importance. 
Such a concentration involves that for the 
present all questions that confronted Eu- 
rope at the outbreak of the war must, until 

140 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

the time for peace negotiations arrives, be 
moved into the background. Above all, the 
imperialistic aims of any of the nations in- 
volved in the war must be frankly pushed 
aside, as a necessary condition to the crush- 
ing of the militaristic spirit in the future, 
wherever it may make its appearance. The 
fight for a moral principle is weakened by 
the intrusion of selfish interests, however 
much those interests may be justified on 
political grounds or on the grounds of ex- 
pediency. The moral issue of the war fur- 
ther demands that all those fighting on the 
side of freedom and liberty must recognize 
the inherent injustice of dividing up any 
part of the world among strong nations, to 
the disadvantage of weaker ones, and in dis- 
regard of the rights and happiness of the 
people inhabiting the region upon which a 
strong nation fixes its eyes. Exploitation 
must give way to cooperation in the 
triumph of the moral issue. Annexation 
must yield to a policy of resuscitating 

141 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

regions that through misrule or through 
other causes have been allowed to fall into 
decay. That applies particularly to the 
East, which as the mother of civilization and 
the birthplace of the great religions of the 
world, and fertile source of art and litera- 
ture, must be resuscitated, not conquered. 7 
And, lastly, this one word of warning for 
those of us more particularly who are not 
engaged in the actual struggle, but who are 
watching it with anxious hearts. Let us not 
becloud the issue by harboring the spirit of 
vengeance or by encouraging the spirit of 
hatred. To hate an entire people is an im- 
moral act — aye, almost a crime; and when 
fighting for a lofty principle, we are risking 
the concentration of all our strength on the 
main issue by translating the principle for 
which we are fighting into terms of hatred. 
For those who are in the field of action, the 

7 See further on this aspect of the situation, the 
author's " The War and the Bagdad Railway." p. 
140 et seq. 

142 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

warning is unnecessary, for when face to 
face with the foe, the tragedy of the situa- 
tion is so overwhelming as to drive away 
every thought except that of the horror of 
the struggle. Such, at all events, is the testi- 
mony of those who come back and tell us 
of the feelings engendered on the battle- 
field. In the moment of supreme danger, 
when about to kill one whom one does not 
know, and in many cases one does not see, 
passion may be an impelling factor, but not 
hate. But for us who do not incur personal 
danger, while our indignation at wrongs 
committed should be strong, while we should 
condemn the brutalities and atrocities of the 
war without mercy, while we should not 
yield in our determination to carry the issue 
to a triumphant conclusion, we weaken the 
cause in which we are engaged by convert- 
ing our just indignation into hatred. A 
moral issue stands high above hatred. It 
needs no hatred to inspire those who believe 
in it with confidence in its ultimate triumph. 

143 



THE PROBLEM OF PEACE 

The idea of what is right and just makes 
its way by its inherent force, and the idea 
in the present conflict is Ahuramazda, the 
power that makes for good. Hatred is in 
the service of Ahriman, the power of evil. 
The triumph of the moral issue involved in 
the war is the victory of Ahuramazda over 
Ahriman, the overcoming of evil by the over- 
throw of power — the enthronement of right 
as against might; and this will be followed, 
as surely as the day follows the night, by the 
dawn of a new era of light and peace for the 
entire world. 



144 



Deacidified using the Bookkeeper proi 
Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide 
Treatment Date: .„ 2001 

PreservationTechnolog 

A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERV/ 



111 Thomson Park Drive 
Cranberry Township, PA 1 6066 
(724)779-2111 




ffl&fm 



mSSSL 



^H 



mmm 



'r&ft£ 






H 



m 



fm 



HK 



2i3S2 



